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1. Executive Summary 
Objectives of this study 
Vocational qualifications provide practical skills that are directly aligned to employment in 
one or more occupations, and can also prepare learners to re-enter academic education. 
They play a critical role in building a skilled and productive workforce. They are currently 
developed and supplied by Awarding Organisations (AOs); AOs must in turn meet the 
regulatory requirements of the Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation 
(Ofqual). Training providers, such as Further Education (FE) Colleges, Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs) and independent training providers, buy the right to deliver vocational 
qualifications from AOs.  
The vocational qualifications market is of central importance to the FE sector and 
absorbs significant levels of public funding through training provider spending. The 
government is keen to ensure that the market for publicly funded vocational qualifications 
operates effectively and efficiently. The outcomes such a market should aim for were 
articulated in the recent “Report of the Independent Panel on Technical Education” 
(Sainsbury et al, 2016): 
“The main purpose of our technical education qualifications and certification system 
should be to signal to employers what an individual can do. To be effective, certification 
must have genuine labour market currency – evidenced by employers choosing to 
employ someone who has the technical education certificate over someone who has not 
– in turn leading to individuals and parents understanding the value of technical 
education. Equally, individuals must be confident the [16-19] certificate they work hard to 
achieve, and which either they or the public purse pays for, will be recognised wherever 
they seek work in the future” (Sainsbury et al, 2016). 
With these objectives in mind, four key characteristics of qualifications that would 
demonstrate that the vocational qualifications market is operating effectively are that 
qualifications are:  
• Recognisable. A qualification is recognisable if all relevant stakeholders can 
quickly and easily identify learners’ skill levels; 
• Rigorous. A qualification is rigorous if all learners holding a particular qualification 
meet the required standard; 
• Responsive. A qualification is responsive if its content remains relevant and 
responds positively to changing employer and learner demands; and 
• Innovative. A qualification is innovative if AOs are able to find new and better ways 
of meeting current or anticipated demand. 
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In the rest of the report, we refer interchangeably to these four characteristics as the 
RRRI features, characteristics or outcomes.  
There have been concerns that the publicly funded vocational qualifications market, or at 
least some parts of it, is not currently delivering qualifications that demonstrate RRRI 
characteristics. This report goes on to explore the evidence for this in more detail. 
However, it should be noted that there are clear tensions between these four 
characteristics such that it may not be possible to achieve all aims at once1. Given the 
potential for trade-offs, we consider which characteristics are important for different parts 
of the market.  
Focusing on publicly funded vocational qualifications in England2 for learners aged 16 
and older, the objectives of this study were therefore to:  
• Define the vocational qualifications market and sub-markets, so that we can 
understand how various parts of the market differ and then use this as an 
appropriate basis for focusing our analysis;  
• Assess the extent to which the market(s) is currently delivering qualifications that 
demonstrate RRRI characteristics, and if not, identify the parts of the market in 
which this is more and less likely to be the case; 
• Identify potential weaknesses in the market(s) that could be hindering its ability to 
deliver qualifications that demonstrate RRRI characteristics; and  
• Finally, to assess the benefits and risks associated with potential options for 
reforming the market to address those weaknesses. 
We have carried out both quantitative and qualitative analysis to inform our findings. Our 
quantitative analysis has drawn on specialised administrative data sets (such as the 
Individualised Learner Record, ILR) and other secondary data (such as the Employer 
Perspectives Survey). Alongside this, we have undertaken a programme of qualitative 
fieldwork involving semi-structured interviews with around 35 stakeholders across the 
market including Awarding Organisations (AOs); training providers, employers and 
regulators. 
                                            
 
1  For example, for qualifications to be recognisable, it may be desirable for qualifications to be stable 
and unchanging. However, this could in some circumstances directly contradict the ability of qualifications 
to be responsive, particularly if employer and learner needs evolve over time. Similarly, fixed assessment 
methods may ensure a consistent standard and therefore promote rigour, but could potentially inhibit 
innovation in response to new technologies and demands. 
2  Whilst HNCs and HNDs are within scope of this definition, for reasons of data availability, the 
analysis within this report has not been able to examine them in any detail.  
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Defining the market 
Market definition was an important first stage of our assessment. The purpose of the 
market definition exercise was to identify the scope of actual and potential competition 
across the publicly funded vocational qualifications market so that we could analyse if 
competition is working well or not. The process of market definition allowed us to narrow 
the focus of later competition analysis to the relevant products (e.g. vocational 
qualifications in a given sector subject area) and geographies (e.g. regions in England) 
by identifying the main competitive constraints that operate within the sub-markets of 
interest. 
We reviewed a range of evidence to reach a view about the different markets that form 
part of the vocational qualifications space. We were guided by the standard Competition 
and Markets Authority framework, but took a pragmatic rather than exhaustive approach 
to definition, in keeping with the policy driven objectives of this study.  
Our analysis suggests that the vocational qualifications market is appropriately 
delineated and analysed according to Sector Subject Areas (SSA), method of learning 
(classroom-based vocational qualifications3 or workplace-based apprenticeships) and by 
age group of learners, as shown below. 
                                            
 
3 We refer throughout the report to these as “general VQs” to distinguish them from apprenticeship 
provision.  
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Figure 1 Defined sub-markets in the vocational qualifications sector 
 
Our analysis has examined how each of these separate sub-markets is demonstrating 
RRRI features as well as drawing together findings across the vocational qualifications 
market as a whole.  
Assessing the extent to which vocational qualifications demonstrate 
RRRI characteristics 
Using the market definition above, the next stage of our analysis assessed the extent to 
which each of the different vocational qualifications markets could be seen to be 
delivering vocational qualifications with RRRI characteristics.  
This part of our analysis was designed to assess the relative performance of different 
parts of the vocational qualifications market, rather than provide an assessment of their 
absolute performance4. This indicative analysis underpins our assessment of the 
weaknesses in the market that hinder RRRI characteristics being observed, described 
later.  
                                            
 
4  A quantitative assessment of the absolute performance of the market was not considered to be 
sufficiently robust.  
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Our assessment of the extent to which different parts of the market were delivering 
vocational qualifications with RRRI characteristics drew upon both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. Our quantitative assessment relied on a suite of indicators, 
developed using the range of available data (such as from the Individualised Learner 
Record (ILR), the Employer Perspectives Survey (EPS) and the Employer Skills Survey 
(ESS)). As an illustration, the table below provides an overview of the indicators used to 
capture the extent to which vocational qualifications in a market could be considered to 
be rigorous (and to some extent recognisable5).  
Table 1 Indicators 
RRRI feature Aggregate indicator Sub Indicator Measure of poor performance 
Rigorous 
Performance 
improvement 
Business 
performance 
High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs improve business performance 
Ability to do jobs High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs improve staff’s ability to do jobs 
Productivity High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs improve productivity 
Preparation for 
work 
High % employers think college leavers are 
poorly or very poorly prepared for work 
Improve skills High % employers think staff had skills gaps 
because training did not improve their skills 
Perceived rigour High % employers think VQs are not as 
rigorous as other qualifications 
Changes over 
time 
Course duration Large % drop in average planned course 
duration 2010/11-2014/15 
Success rates Large % rise success rates 2010/11-2014/15 
Rigorous/ 
recognisable 
Destinations 
Sustained 
employment 
Low % of learners in sustained employment 1 
year after completing course 
Sustained 
learning or 
employment 
Low % learners in sustained learning or 
employment 1 year after completing course 
Increased pay High % employers think VQs rarely or never 
lead to increased pay 
                                            
 
5  Although we used the best available data, in some cases it was not straightforward to disentangle 
one measure from another. For practical reasons, we therefore assessed market performance along two 
RRRI dimensions (i) recognisability and rigour, and (ii) responsiveness and innovation. 
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Promotion or 
increased job 
status 
High % employers think VQs rarely or never 
lead to promotion or improved job status 
Source: Frontier Economics 
Our quantitative assessment of relative performance across the adult general 
vocational qualifications (VQ) market6 is illustrated in the figure below.  
Figure 2: Relative performance for adult general VQs – relative performance quadrants at SSA Tier7  
2 level 
 
 Source: Frontier analysis using data from the ILR, ESS, EPS 
The findings of the quantitative analysis were tested and explored during our 
stakeholder interviews. Overall, our work indicated a substantial variation in 
performance across the market with some subject areas delivering a weak 
performance (relative to other subjects) against the RRRI characteristics.  
                                            
 
6 Separate analysis was undertaken for the 16-19 year old general vocational qualification market and 
apprenticeships. 
7 Note that the horizontal axis spans 0-0.6, whilst the vertical axis spans 0-1. 
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Assessing market weaknesses 
Further analysis was then undertaken to determine what might be driving this 
differential performance and the extent to which this indicated weaknesses in 
individual markets or across the vocational qualifications market as a whole.  
We identified evidence of the following market weaknesses: 
• Misaligned incentives, potentially leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms 
of rigour – The importance of success rates as part of Ofsted ratings may provide 
an incentive for training providers to choose AOs and qualifications that are ‘easier 
to pass’. These incentives are particularly linked with the AO’s role in content 
development and assessment methods. With the exception of the apprenticeships 
market, we observe a rise in success rates and a fall in course duration over time. 
We also find that AOs that have higher success rates (than their competitors) in 
one year attract higher numbers of learners the following year. These findings are 
consistent with a race to the bottom in terms of rigour, though we note other 
factors also drive training providers’ decisions and thus we cannot definitively 
prove the link. 
• Insufficient content regulation, potentially leading to lower rigour – The 
regulation of general vocational qualifications, which does not include regulation of 
curriculum content and assessment strategies, appears insufficient to prevent a 
race to the bottom in terms of rigour. In contrast, in the apprenticeships market we 
do not observe a race to the bottom in terms of higher success rates and 
reductions in course durations. Content in this part of the market is directly 
regulated through apprenticeship frameworks, potentially mitigating this risk.  
• High barriers to training providers switching between AOs in other parts of 
the market, potentially leading to lower rigour, responsiveness and 
innovation from AOs – Our stakeholder interviews suggested that high barriers 
to switching restrict effective choice by training providers between AOs even in 
sub-markets where multiple AOs exist. This analysis suggests there are multiple 
parts of the vocational qualification market where AOs operate in a way that is 
neither constrained by competitors nor by a regulatory framework mimicking 
competitive pressure.  Our quantitative analysis, we found that a low rate of 
switching between AOs was correlated with lower levels of rigour, responsiveness 
and innovation. 
• Smaller training providers lacking the tools and capacity to navigate the 
system is potentially leading to lower rigour, recognisability, 
responsiveness and innovation from AOs – Some stakeholders expressed a 
concern that smaller training providers, in particular private training providers, do 
not have the capacity or access to the appropriate tools to select qualifications that 
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best meet their employers’ and learners’ needs. This is in contrast to FE colleges, 
who often have dedicated market research teams to monitor the AO market. In our 
quantitative analysis, we find that the share of private training providers in a sub-
market is negatively correlated with RRRI outcomes i.e. the greater the proportion 
of smaller training providers in a sub-market, the poorer the overall performance of 
that market. 
• Smaller employers are less likely to be represented in the development of 
vocational qualifications and this is potentially leading to lower 
responsiveness from AOs – Both our quantitative and qualitative findings 
indicate that smaller employers are less likely to be involved in designing 
qualifications than larger employers. This means that the qualifications provided 
may be less suited to their skills needs, where these are systematically different 
from the needs of larger employers. 
• Insufficient head-to-head competition on qualifications between AOs is 
potentially leading to lower responsiveness and innovation from AOs – 
Despite the proliferation of AOs in most segments of the market, competition 
between AOs at the level of individual qualifications is often limited. Where this is 
the case, AOs may face limited incentives to provide high quality customer service 
and innovate in terms of technology and support. We find that head-to-head 
competition is correlated with higher responsiveness and innovation. Training 
providers we interviewed gave examples of AOs in sub-markets with no alternative 
options that fail to innovate or respond to changing technologies. 
As a wider issue relevant for government policy (not directly linked to the RRRI features), 
our analysis also revealed that particularly at lower levels of FE, a high proportion of 
learners take multiple qualifications at the same level. This suggests that learners may 
not face clear routes to progression and/ or sufficient incentives to progress onto higher 
levels of learning. 
It is worth noting that these weaknesses were identified and assessed in the context of 
an overarching assessment of the vocational qualifications market. However, as we have 
already noted, the sector is very diverse with different segments of the market facing 
different priorities and demonstrating the desired RRRI features to different extents. As 
such, not all of the weaknesses identified will be relevant in all segments of the 
vocational qualifications market. Therefore, this suggests policy action to address market 
weaknesses may need to differ across the segments of the market as a policy change in 
one part of the market may not be appropriate in another.  
Assessing options for reforming the market  
Previous studies have found structural issues in the vocational qualifications market and 
questioned whether the competitive model currently in operation is delivering the best 
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possible outcomes for all market participants. The Wolf Review8, for example, found that 
incentives in the system (e.g. what was included in performance tables) were misaligned 
such that training providers were rewarded for offering qualifications with little currency in 
the labour market which led to large numbers of young people enrolling on courses, 
which did not help them succeed in the world of work.  
Although the Wolf report was successful in identifying the need for reform and there has 
been a large reduction in the range of qualifications which can be included in 
performance tables since its publication, recent evidence suggests that structural 
weaknesses in this market persist. The Independent Panel on Technical Education 
chaired by Lord Sainsbury (The Sainsbury Panel), which reported to government in the 
Summer of 2016, found that there is little incentive for AOs to design demanding 
qualifications which meet the requirements of industry because employers find it difficult 
to navigate the system and to remain up to date on the value of competing qualifications. 
This, coupled with the lack of accountability to ensure qualifications meet employers’ 
needs can lead to competition enabling a race to the bottom rather than improving 
outcomes.  
Given our findings about potential weaknesses in the market and the direction of travel 
identified by The Sainsbury Panel, our potential reform options have focused on 
structural reform. That is, we have explored a number of options that change the nature 
of competition in the market, whether that is to introduce competition for the market (via 
some form of tendering), or to change the nature of competition in the market or a 
combination of both. 
For the purposes of exploring structural reform, we identified five key dimensions that 
government will need to take into account in enacting such reform, as described below. 
Importantly, other points of detail will also need to be considered by government in any 
practical implementation of reforms (such as how to provide for contract flexibility or 
intellectual property issues), but these are not discussed here. The dimensions we 
explore are: 
• Market specification. This dimension has some similarities with activity to define 
the market. It consists of specifying the scope of the market considered for reform 
(e.g. 16-19 year olds, adult learners, apprenticeships) and deciding how this 
market should be delineated into sub-markets in which AOs can deliver services 
(e.g. by subject area, or by individual qualification). For example, decisions will 
need to be made around whether reforms cover just the 16-19 vocational 
                                            
 
8 Wolf, A. (2011), Review of Vocational Education – The Wolf Report (available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/180504/DFE-00031-
2011.pdf)  
16 
 
qualifications market or adults too; and whether vocational qualifications in those 
sub-markets should be separated into occupational clusters (e.g. retail and 
commercial, health care), and if so, the number of routes. A further decision might 
also be needed around whether these routes should be separated further into sub-
routes (either according to parts of the pathway or specific occupational groups) or 
even individual qualifications which AOs would be licenced to provide. This aspect 
can be considered the ‘contract breadth’. 
• Product chain. This dimension specifies the elements of the product chain which 
organisations will be licenced to deliver. The key elements are the development of 
the content of the qualifications, the provision of delivery support to training 
providers; and assessment of learners’ competence. A decision needs to be made 
about whether AOs would be licenced to deliver all of the elements, or only some 
of them. If contracts are awarded, a decision also needs to be made on how 
elements of the product chain are packaged into contracts. This can be 
considered the ‘contract depth’. 
• Exclusivity of market access. This dimension specifies the extent to which 
organisations will face competition both to access the market and once in the 
market. For example, where a vocational qualifications route is licenced, this 
would relate to how many AOs are awarded a licence to operate in that space 
(they could be a monopolist or face competition from other licenced AOs).   
• Length of contract. This dimension specifies the length of the period for which 
access to the market is granted, for example three or five years.  
• Wider regulatory and policy environment. This dimension concerns decisions 
around the nature of policy and regulatory frameworks to facilitate the desired 
market outcomes.  
Decisions also need to be made on other cross-cutting issues around the following two 
dimensions: 
• Licence evaluation criteria. If the market moves towards tendering contracts, the 
criteria for assessing tenders need to be specified. In particular, decisions need to 
be made about the weight placed on price and quality, as well as how quality is 
defined for the different elements of the product chain. Another aspect to consider 
is how to handle a situation in which, under exclusive licences per route or sub-
route, a single AO wins all or most of the contracts.  
• Eligibility to bid. A decision is needed about who is eligible to bid. The key 
considerations here may be around whether an AO would need to be Ofqual-
regulated or not as well as whether they have sufficient operational capacity. 
Depending on how the markets are defined and how many contracts per sub-route 
are awarded, the scale of the contracts might be very substantial. Qualitative 
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evidence suggests that scaling up operations significantly for small AOs is not 
straightforward, and at times might be impossible within a fixed period of time. 
Therefore it needs to be decided if minimum operational capacity requirements are 
to be imposed on the bidders, the extent to which consortia would be supported, 
considered and assessed.   
It was not feasible for us to cover the full breadth of possible reform options in our 
analysis so in order to illustrate the risks and benefits associated with different reform 
options, we carried out an assessment of six policy scenarios designed to  reflect the 
broad range of possible reforms that government may wish to consider going forward.  
The scenarios we have examined are broadly reflective of the reforms proposed in the 
Sainsbury Panel in that they assume the establishment of technical routes and then 
consider different options for changing the way in which competition operates within the 
market, moving from free competition between AOs to a more managed system of 
licences. For the purposes of our analysis we assume that licences are awarded on the 
basis of a tendering exercise. 
The policy scenarios we have analysed are summarised below.  
Figure 3: Policy scenarios considered 
 
 Source: Frontier analysis  
In the first three scenarios we examine the effects of possible reforms to the 16-19 
market, assuming no changes to the current adult market. The differences between the 
first three scenarios are around: 
Decision 1: which markets 
to tender
16-19 market all routes together, 
adult market as now 
Decision 2: what product is 
tendered
Decision 3: exclusivity of 
market access
Single exclusive license
Decision 4: duration of 
contract
5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
16-19 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, adult market as now 
Single exclusive license 3 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 3
16-19 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, adult market as now 
Multiple licenses 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 4
Adult 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, market for 16 - 19 as in 
Scenario 2 or 3
Multiple licenses 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 5
Adult 15 routes (and multiple, e.g. 
20, sub routes within each route) 
tendered separately, market for 16 -
19 as in Scenario 2 or 3
Single exclusive license 3 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 6
Adult 15 routes (and multiple, e.g. 
20, sub routes within each route) 
tendered separately, market for 16 -
19 as in Scenario 2 or 3
Single exclusive license 3 years
Content, delivery, assessment
[content designed by AOs]
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• the size of the market segment that a licence is awarded to supply - ranging from 
the whole of the 16-19 market in scenario 1 to a single sub-route (or tech level) in 
scenarios 2 and 3; 
• whether a single supplier is licenced to offer services in the relevant market 
segment (as in scenarios 1 and 2) or multiple licences are awarded within each 
market segment as in scenario 3; 
• whether the duration of licences is 5 years (as in scenarios 1 and 3) or 3 years as 
in scenario 2; 
Scenarios 4, 5 and 6 relate to reforms of the adult vocational qualifications market, 
assuming the 16-19 market undergoes reforms. The differences between the second 
three scenarios are around: 
• the size of the adult market segment that a licence is awarded to supply.  
• the aspects of the product chain in which AOs are licenced to offer services 
ranging from the full product chain (as in the current system) in scenario 6 to 
customer support and assessment in scenarios 4 and 5. 
• whether a single supplier is licenced to offer services in the relevant market 
segment (as in scenarios 5 and 6) or multiple licences are awarded within each 
market segment as in scenario 4; and 
• whether the duration of licences is 5 years (as in scenario 4) or 3 years as in 
scenarios 5 and 6. 
In the main body of the report we examine in detail the benefits and risks associated with 
each of these scenarios, which we do not reproduce here. However, our assessment led 
to a number of cross-cutting findings as described below.  
Moving to a more centralised system has the potential to bring significant benefits to the 
market. For example, centralising content and assessment can improve recognition and 
rigour and remove the incentives for a race to the bottom style of competition. We found 
in our analysis that for technical subjects, like manufacturing technologies, engineering 
and accounting and finance, employers place a high value on recognisable and rigorous 
content, with perhaps less weight placed on the ability of these vocational qualifications 
to be innovative in how they are assessed. A small number of clearly defined routes and 
a single AO delivering all of those routes could aid recognition among learners and 
employers. What is more, setting content for a period of time provides stability in the 
market. The improved rigour and recognition should ultimately translate into improved 
labour market outcomes for learners undertaking vocational qualifications. 
However, a centralised system could also present risks. Our work has found that 
competition can be an effective tool in driving improvements in customer support (our 
stakeholders reported that this is a service that is high value for them, and that this is a 
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key way in which AOs compete) so a reduction in competition in that part of the product 
chain could potentially have negative effects on customer service. Reforms introducing 
competition for the market hence need to be mindful of this dynamic and consider how to 
mimic competitive incentives for maintaining customer service in a market.   
There is also a risk of system failure associated with limiting access to the market to a 
single AO (or consortia). If the AO (or AO consortium) fails there may be no alternative 
AO to step in (although this risk could be mitigated against if for example there are 
contingencies in place for other AOs or indeed government to act as the “provider of last 
resort”). In the long term, limiting access to the market to a single AO (or consortia) could 
reduce the competition for that route. 
The risks are greater when tendering very broad contracts that award a single monopoly 
AO (or consortium) a licence to deliver large proportions of the qualifications (i.e. relying 
only on competition for the market), than if contracts are tendered to allow multiple AOs 
to operate in the market to deliver particular qualifications (i.e. allowing for some 
competition in the market). There are also risks associated with constraining contract 
depth (i.e. licensing only assessment, while designing vocational qualifications’ content 
centrally). These include challenges to the practical delivery of such content by AOs and 
a risk to responsiveness if that content is not updated at appropriate intervals in line with 
employer needs.  
Ultimately, designing structural reforms in the market requires a number of decisions to 
be taken, and each of these involves trade-offs between benefits and risks. The 
government will have to reach a judgement as to which risks are acceptable and whether 
or not any mitigating actions can be taken. Mitigation actions to manage these risks must 
be considered alongside exploring potential reforms. Many of the above risks can be 
mitigated through appropriate mechanisms, and it is essential to think through these 
possible mitigating solutions carefully when any reform choices will be made. For 
example: 
• To avoid system failure, there could be a requirement that AOs operating in routes 
for which they have not tendered have capacity to be called upon to step in to 
deliver assessment services should an AO fail in another route. 
• To avoid ‘shorting’ the market such that upon re-tendering, there remain no 
alternative AOs who could credibly bid, multiple routes could be tendered such 
that a number of AOs are able to operate within the market. 
• To learn more about the most appropriate means through which to overcome the 
challenges associated with specifying contracts for such complex deliverables, it 
may be desirable to phase the introduction of tendering such that some parts of 
the market can be used as ‘trials’ to help learn what works and the potential 
behaviours of market participants.  
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Importantly, given we have identified that there are differences across the market in 
terms of the extent to which vocational qualifications demonstrate RRRI characteristics, 
and the weaknesses in the market that lead to particular outcomes observed, policy 
makers must ensure policy changes are tailored to the market conditions. That is, there 
may be justification for implementing a policy change in one part of the market, and a 
different policy change in others (subject to interdependencies or interactions across 
those markets). However, risks associated with reforms in one part of the market (e.g. 
adult vocational qualifications) are likely to be significantly dependent on decisions made 
about reforms in other parts of the market (e.g. young persons’ vocational qualifications). 
These interdependencies need to be carefully considered when reform options are 
identified to avoid unintended side-effects in linked markets.  
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2. Introduction 
Context and objectives 
Vocational qualifications provide practical skills that are directly aligned to employment in 
one or more occupations, and can also prepare learners to re-enter academic education. 
They therefore play a critical role in building a skilled and productive workforce. They are 
currently developed and supplied by Awarding Organisations (AOs); publicly funded 
qualifications are regulated by the Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation 
(Ofqual). Trainings, such as Further Education (FE) Colleges and independent providers, 
buy the right to deliver vocational qualifications from AOs.  
The qualifications market is of central importance to the FE sector and absorbs 
significant levels of public funding through training provider spending. Evidence9 from the 
Association of Colleges (AoC) suggests that FE Colleges spend on average around 3% 
of their income on examinations which equates to around £215 million annually for those 
training providers alone.  
The government is keen to ensure that the market for vocational qualifications operates 
effectively and efficiently. The outcomes such a market should aim for were articulated in 
the recent “Report of the Independent Panel on Technical Education” (Sainsbury et al, 
2016): 
“The main purpose of our technical education qualifications and certification system 
should be to signal to employers what an individual can do. To be effective, certification 
must have genuine labour market currency – evidenced by employers choosing to 
employ someone who has the technical education certificate over someone who has not 
– in turn leading to individuals and parents understanding the value of technical 
education. Equally, individuals must be confident the [16-19] certificate they work hard to 
achieve, and which either they or the public purse pays for, will be recognised wherever 
they seek work in the future” (Sainsbury et al, 2016). 
With these outcomes in mind, four particular characteristics of vocational qualifications 
that one would expect to observe if the market were operating effectively are that the 
qualifications are:  
• Recognisable. A qualification is recognisable if all relevant stakeholders can 
quickly and easily identify learners’ skill levels; 
                                            
 
9  HMT/BIS/DfE Joint Review of Further Education Costs available here: 
https://www.aoc.co.uk/sites/default/files/Joint%20review%20of%20Further%20Education%20costs%20-
%20BIS,%20DfE,%20HMT.pdf 
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• Rigorous. A qualification is rigorous if all learners holding a particular qualification 
meet the required standard; 
• Responsive. A qualification is responsive if its content remains relevant and 
responds positively to changing employer and learner demands; and 
• Innovative. A qualification is innovative if AOs are able to find new and better ways 
of meeting current or anticipated demand. 
These characteristics (recognisable, rigorous, responsive and innovative, referred to as 
RRRI in this report) are important measures against which we can therefore assess the 
performance of the market, as described in chapter 6. It is important to note that the 
extent to which these characteristics is desirable is likely to vary across vocational 
qualifications. 
Over the years, there have been concerns that the market is not performing well in terms 
of RRRI. This is for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the system is regularly said to be too complex. For example, the Wolf Review10 
suggested that the FE sector is “extraordinarily complex and opaque by international 
standards”. The system in England is unlike systems in most other countries as it is 
qualification-led while in most other countries, qualifications tend to be process-based 
and institutional (i.e. assessment focuses on participation in a programme of study) 
where final certificates and diplomas are issued by the State and/or regional/local 
bodies11. In England, qualifications are supplied by Awarding Organisations (AOs) and 
Ofqual data12 shows that there are currently 163 AOs in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland offering almost 25,000 qualifications in total (though not all are awarded each 
year). Such complexity in the market could have potential implications for the 
recognisability of vocational qualifications in the market; and also implies the market is 
not transparent. 
Secondly, there are concerns that the system lacks clear routes for progression to higher 
level skills or a sustainable career with too many young people13 obtaining qualifications 
which are of little or no labour market value. It is argued that the incentives created by the 
funding regime (which essentially remunerates on a per qualification basis) may have 
contributed to a significant growth in the number of qualifications (the number of AOs has 
increased by nearly 50% over the last 10 years and the number of regulated 
                                            
 
10  Review of Vocational Education – The Wolf Report (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/180504/DFE-00031-2011.pdf   
11  Young, M. (2002) Contrasting approaches to the role of qualifications in the promotion of lifelong learning. In Evans, K., 
Hodkinson, P. and Unwin, L. (ads) Working to Learn, London: Kogan Page 
12  Ofqual Annual Qualifications Market Report England, Wales and Northern Ireland 2013/14 Academic Year available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544429/Annual-qualifications-market-report-england-
wales-and-northern-ireland-2014-15.pdf  
13 It has been estimated that 350,000 young people 16-19 are relevant here, though more recent work funded by BIS (Urwin et al) is 
challenging this picture.  
23 
 
qualifications in the sector has increased by 66% in the last 5 years14). AELP and 
Pearson analysis published in April 2016 identifies a lack of awareness about vocational 
learning routes into work, which may be holding back many young people from finding 
sustainable employment15. Such proliferation of vocational qualifications again suggests 
a risk to their recognisability.  
Thirdly, many employers report hard to fill vacancies due to a lack of skills16 - this 
suggests that vocational qualifications may not always be responsive and meet the 
needs of employers. However, there are, of course, a number of other reasons why some 
vacancies may be hard to fill, including the wage offered and wider labour market 
conditions. 
Fourthly, there have been concerns that competition between AOs may have detrimental 
effects on the rigour of vocational qualifications leading to a potential ‘race to the 
bottom’17.  
To explore these issues in more depth and assess the performance of the publicly 
funded vocational qualifications market in England, Frontier Economics were 
commissioned to carry out a robust study.  
Objectives of this study 
In view of the context described above, this study focuses on publicly funded vocational 
qualifications in England (regulated by Ofqual and excluding GCSEs and A-Levels) for 
learners aged 16 and older, and has the following objectives.  
• Firstly, to define the vocational qualification market and sub-markets. This 
provides a framework for us to examine the nature and performance of the market, 
and importantly, to help us understand how these aspects differ across the various 
sub-markets; 
• Secondly, to carry out an assessment of the extent to which the market is 
delivering vocational qualifications that have RRRI characteristics, and to identify 
the parts of the market in which this is more, or less, likely to be the case; 
                                            
 
14 Source: Ofqual statistical release https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544429/Annual-
qualifications-market-report-england-wales-and-northern-ireland-2014-15.pdf  
15 http://www.aelp.org.uk/news/general/details/aelp-pearson-report-routes-into-work-it-s-alrig/  
16 See UK Employer Skills Survey 2015 available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukces-employer-skills-survey-2015-
uk-report 
17 See for example the Report of the Independent Panel on Technical Education available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/536046/Report_of_the_Independent_Panel_on_Techni
cal_Education.pdf; OECD (2014) Skills Beyond School;  and Review of Vocational Education – The Wolf Report (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/180504/DFE-00031-2011.pdf  
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• Thirdly, to identify any weaknesses in the market that could be hindering the 
market’s ability to deliver vocational qualifications that have RRRI characteristics; 
and  
• Finally, to explore potential reforms to the market that address those weaknesses, 
and the associated benefits and risks, along with how those risks could be 
mitigated.  
Approach 
We have brought together a wide range of quantitative and qualitative evidence to inform 
this study including: 
• Quantitative analysis. We carried out detailed analysis of the most recent and 
comprehensive data sets available to understand how the vocational qualifications 
market currently operates as well as any variation in performance across sub-
markets. The data sets we have studied include the Individualised Learner Record 
(ILR) for the most recent 5-year period available (2010/11 to 2014/15), the Work 
and Pensions Longitudinal Study matched to the ILR (2014/15), the Employer 
Perspectives Survey (EPS), the Employer Satisfaction Survey (ESS), as well as a 
number of other publicly available data sets, such as the Ofqual register of 
qualifications. 
• Qualitative analysis. We carried out a programme of engagement with 
stakeholders across the sector to ensure that we have been able to develop a 
deep understanding of the functioning of the vocational qualifications market from 
those that operate within it and those that use it. We conducted 35 semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders including learner representatives, private training 
providers, Further Education Colleges, Awarding Organisations, policy makers 
and regulators. We wish to thank all the stakeholders for their time and very 
valuable input to this study.  
• Evidence review. We have reviewed relevant published literature to understand 
how the vocational qualifications market in England compares with international 
comparators. We also reviewed other publications (by Ofqual, the previous Office 
for Fair Trading and others) which examined the state of the vocational 
qualifications market. In addition, we have reviewed the websites of funding 
agencies, Awarding Organisations and others to understand in more detail how 
different parts of the market work. 
• Workshops and expert challenge. At key points in the project, we held four 
workshops with policy leads from the Department for Education (DfE) and the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to discuss emerging findings and 
receive feedback on our work. We also received feedback from DfE’s academic 
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panel, composed of leading academics working in the vocational education field. 
The work has further benefited from critical challenge from our sector experts 
Professor Lorna Unwin and Mick Fletcher who have deep knowledge of the FE 
sector and have published extensively in the area.  
Our work was organised into 5 steps (described in Figure 1). 
Figure 4: Methodology  
 
Source: Frontier Economics 
• Step 1 (Chapter 3) - Market mapping of the landscape of vocational 
qualifications: this involved describing the breadth and coverage of the publicly 
funded vocational qualifications market in England and the activities of key parties 
that engage with it. This includes information on Awarding Organisations, learners, 
employers, training providers, regulation and funding.  
• Step 2 (Chapter 4) - Outcomes of an effective vocational qualifications 
market: we articulated the outcomes likely to be associated with an effective 
vocational qualifications market. We then identified a range of quantitative 
indicators which could be used to assess whether the market is delivering those 
outcomes. 
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• Step 3 (Chapter 5) - Market definition: we carried out a market definition 
exercise, in line with established Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) 
methods, to identify distinct areas of provision within this diverse sector. This 
provided a framework with which we could assess the performance of the market 
and how this varies across the sub-markets.  
• Step 4 (Chapters 6 and 7) - Market assessment: we drew on a range of data 
sets to construct indicators which could allow us to assess how well different sub-
markets perform. Chapter 6 illustrates the diversity within the vocational 
qualifications market and provides a relative assessment of performance across 
sub-markets. Chapter 7 builds on chapter 6 to formulate hypotheses about the 
drivers of outcomes observed and the weaknesses in the market, and uses 
quantitative and qualitative evidence to test those hypotheses.  
• Step 5 (Chapter 8) - Options for reform: building on the findings from the market 
assessment work (Step 4 in Chapters 6 and 7), and drawing on evidence from 
other vocational education systems, we analysed a small number of policy reform 
scenarios to understand the risks and benefits associated with different types of 
policy options. 
This report follows the structure described above, beginning with a brief overview (in 
chapter 3) that maps the landscape of the vocational qualifications market in England. 
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3. Landscape for vocational qualifications in England  
Introduction 
The vocational qualifications market in England is unlike that of any other country. The 
key difference is that Awarding Organisations, rather than government, currently play the 
leading role in the design, development, delivery and award of vocational qualifications.  
This chapter maps the landscape for vocational qualifications in terms of: 
• Defining what we mean by vocational qualifications; 
• Describing the supply of, and demand for, vocational qualifications in England; 
• Describing the regulatory environment in which vocational qualifications are 
delivered;  
• Describing public funding for vocational qualifications; and 
• Drawing comparisons with international vocational qualifications systems. 
Vocational qualifications in England 
We defined vocational qualifications18 above as aiming to “…provide practical skills that 
are directly aligned to employment in one or more occupations, and can also prepare 
learners to re-enter academic education. They play a critical role in building a skilled and 
productive workforce.” 
In England, FE training providers deliver vocational qualifications to learners primarily via 
two methods: College-based (where the learner develops their knowledge, skills and 
competences, largely delivered by teachers in a College or Further Education setting, 
though the study programme may also include work placements); and employer-based 
(such as an apprenticeship where the learner develops their skills and competences 
largely on-the-job while also developing knowledge by spending some time in a Further 
Education setting).  
AOs currently design, support the delivery of, and assess the quality of vocational 
qualifications in England. FE training providers buy the right to deliver vocational 
qualifications from AOs. The ‘product’ that FE training providers currently purchase from 
AOs consists of several elements, as shown in Figure 5. Although the elements are 
displayed separately, they tend to be bundled together by the AO into a package. 
                                            
 
18 The phrase ‘vocational qualifications’ is used interchangeably with ‘technical qualifications’ throughout this report. 
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Figure 5: The vocational qualifications product chain  
 
As shown in Figure 5, the component parts of what a training provider buys from the AO 
are: 
• Curriculum and course materials: these refer to the content of the qualification in 
terms of the curriculum which describes the knowledge, skills or competences that 
need to be mastered in order for the qualification to be awarded; 
• Training on curriculum and course materials: this refers to the work that AOs 
undertake to ensure that teachers or tutors are familiar with what needs to be 
covered, and the materials that can be used to support the learning and 
development of knowledge, skills and competences;  
• Design and implementation of assessment method and quality assurance: this 
important part of the role of AOs refers to the process of developing appropriate 
methods through which the knowledge, skills and competences of a learner can 
be accurately assessed to inform whether they have reached the appropriate 
standard to be awarded a qualification. Alongside this activity is the guidance and 
verification that the quality assurance processes of the training providers are 
adequate; 
• Award of qualification: vocational qualifications should only be awarded when 
there are adequate assurances that the learner has achieved the required 
standard of knowledge, skills and competences. Various methods are used to 
ensure the standards have been met. For example, in some cases, exams are 
used (and the AO may check a sample to ensure standards are maintained); in 
others, course work must be accurately marked (again the AO may carry out 
sampling to test the rigour of the assessment); while in others a trained assessor 
(sometimes internal to the training provider where quality assurance processes 
are in place) must observe the learner carrying out particular tasks to verify that 
the required standard of skills and competences have been demonstrated. 
• On-going support to the training provider: underpinning all of the elements above 
is the on-going support that AOs offer training providers. Typically, relationship 
managers from the AOs are assigned to FE training providers to ensure that they 
have ready access to support and advice as needed.   
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The qualifications offered by AOs are not regulated, but the AOs themselves are. FE 
training providers are at liberty to choose to work with whichever AO offers vocational 
qualifications that best meet the needs of their learners and local employers. For public 
funding to be drawn down by FE training providers, the AO must be regulated by Ofqual. 
These issues are explained further below. 
Supply of and demand for vocational qualifications in England 
The vocational qualification system in England is unique in that qualifications which 
attract public funding are developed and supplied not by the government but by AOs. 
AOs differ in their size and nature – some are professional bodies, others are private 
firms and many have charitable status.  
There are currently 163 AOs supplying around 25,000 regulated qualifications (vocational 
and academic) in England and awarding around 8.4 million vocational certificates 
annually. As shown in Table 2,19 the AO market for vocational qualifications is 
characterised by a small number of very large AOs (the largest 10 AOs award around 
70% of all certificates issued) and a long tail of relatively small AOs.   
Table 2: Vocational certificates awarded by 10 largest AOs and other AOs in 2014/15 
Awarding organisation Certificates in 2014/15 
Pearson Education Ltd 1,899,900 
City and Guilds of London Institute 1,330,900 
OCR 480,500 
Cambridge English Language Assessment 297,200 
AQA Education 284,700 
Cambridge International Examinations 281,100 
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health 279,200 
Highfield Awarding Body for Compliance 272,200 
NCFE 270,900 
Associated Board of the Royal School of Music 255,100 
                                            
 
19 The certificate numbers relate to figures supplied by AOs to Ofqual, and are not specific to publicly-
funded provision. The table includes all non-GCSE and A-levels so not all of these would strictly be 
considered vocational qualifications. The source is: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544429/Annual-
qualifications-market-report-england-wales-and-northern-ireland-2014-15.pdf   
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Other AOs 2,720,000 
Total 8,371,800 
Source: Ofqual Statistical Release 2014/15 
The customer chain for vocational qualifications is complex and demand for qualifications 
is often “derived” in the sense that the ultimate consumer of the qualifications (the learner 
or employer) is not likely to be the direct purchaser (the FE training provider). The 
customer chain is stylised in Figure 6. As shown, for provider-based training, the 
immediate customers of AOs are training providers, which include schools, colleges and 
independent training providers. There are currently around 350 FE Colleges (including 
Sixth Form Colleges, General FE and Tertiary Colleges and Agriculture and Horticulture 
Colleges), more than 600 private training providers, more than 1,160 School Sixth Forms 
and 247 Adult Community Learning and Skills providers.20 Training providers offer 
teaching to learners – some of whom may be participating in an FE vocational 
qualification in order to move on to Higher Education and some of whom will be training 
with the aim of seeking employment immediately after qualifying.  
For employer-based learning (such as apprenticeships), apprenticeship ‘frameworks’ 
have, to date, typically included one or more vocational qualifications which would be 
awarded to the learner upon satisfactory completion of the apprenticeship. However, the 
recent move to apprenticeship ‘standards’, many of which are currently being developed 
through ‘Trailblazers’, do not necessarily include vocational qualifications and hence AO 
involvement in this part of the market could be lower in the future than has been the case 
to date. Where vocational qualifications do form part of the apprenticeship the immediate 
customer will again be the training provider, with the apprentices and employers both 
being further along the customer chain.   
Figure 6: Customer chain for vocational qualifications 
                                            
 
20 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544310/bis-16-360-fe-market-england.pdf  
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The existence of a long customer chain in which the customer at each stage faces 
choices that are likely to be influenced by different factors adds to the complexity of the 
system. It raises the risk that the incentives of different customers may not align. This 
complex situation is compounded by the fact that ‘quality’ of qualifications is likely to be 
interpreted differently by each customer. For example, a training provider may interpret 
‘quality’ of a vocational qualification as being related to whether the AO is regulated, has 
a good reputation with training providers and local employers, offers relevant and timely 
support and provides learners with a well-rounded set of transferable skills to support 
their future employment. In contrast, an employer may interpret quality of the qualification 
as the extent to which learners have the specific skills they need for the specific job for 
which they are employed.  
The incentives facing stakeholders under the current regulatory and funding system, and 
the ways in which these can lead to different outcomes, are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7. Inevitably, given the complex nature of the market there are trade-offs 
between achievable outcomes. Regulation and funding, in particular, are likely to affect 
the incentives driving behaviours of those in the market.  
Regulation 
AOs are regulated by Ofqual whose aim is to ensure that AOs can produce valid21 
qualifications which meet user needs. Ofqual regulates the process of developing 
qualifications and monitors the financial viability of AOs. Ofqual’s regulatory framework is 
underpinned by its General Conditions of Recognition (GCR) which set out a series of 
                                            
 
21 Validity is the degree to which a qualification measures what needs to be measured through its assessment procedure. 
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requirements (such as validity, reliability, comparability) which regulated qualifications 
need to meet. There are also a number of governance, compliance and cooperation 
conditions for AOs. AOs are required by Ofqual to submit an Annual Statement of 
Compliance which is compared against other information and intelligence. Regulatory 
action is taken in instances of non-compliance.  
Funding 
Public funding for vocational qualifications is provided by the Education Funding Agency 
(for learners aged 16-19), and by the Skills Funding Agency (for learners aged 19-24 and 
apprentices aged 16+, and advanced learning loans for learners aged 24+). Only 
qualifications which are regulated by Ofqual can attract public funding from the SFA, but 
not all Ofqual regulated qualifications are publicly funded. For example, for people aged 
less than 19, Government has the ability to decide which qualifications are eligible for 
public funding through the use of Section 9622.  
  
                                            
 
22 Section 96 is a section of the Learning and Skills Act 2000. It gives the Secretary of State the power to approve qualifications for 
delivery to young people aged less than 19 years old. Public funding is only available for qualifications which have been section 96 
approved.  
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4. Market Definition 
Key findings 
• Market definition is an important stage in our assessment of how, and to what 
extent, competition in the market delivers vocational qualifications which are 
rigorous, recognisable, responsive and innovative.  
• We reviewed a range of evidence to reach a view about the different markets that 
form part of the vocational qualifications space. We were guided by the standard 
Competition and Markets Authority framework, but took a pragmatic rather than 
exhaustive approach to definition, in keeping with the policy driven objectives of 
this study.  
• Our work suggests that the vocational qualifications market is appropriately 
delineated by Sector Subject Areas (SSA), method of learning (classroom-based 
general vocational qualifications or workplace-based apprenticeships) and by age 
group of learners, as shown below. 
 
Figure 7 Defined sub-markets in the vocational qualifications market 
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Defining the market 
To develop a thorough understanding of the way a market is functioning, it is important to 
develop a clear definition of that market. This chapter describes how we have defined the 
market for vocational qualifications. In particular we describe: 
• The purpose of defining a market; 
• The standard economic framework for defining markets; and 
• The application of the framework to the vocational qualifications market in 
England. 
The purpose of defining a market 
The purpose of market definition is to identify the scope of actual and potential 
competition so that we can analyse the extent to which competition is working well or not.  
The process of market definition narrows the focus of the competition analysis to the 
relevant products (e.g. vocational qualification sector subject area) and geographies (e.g. 
regions in England) by identifying the main competitive constraints that operate on the 
product of interest.  
 
For the purposes of this study, we wished to reach a view about the different markets that 
form part of the vocational qualifications space so that we could analyse these sub-
markets separately with a view to understanding how they were functioning and the role 
that competition was playing. We were guided by the standard Competition and Markets 
Authority framework, but took a pragmatic rather than exhaustive approach to definition, 
in keeping with the policy objectives of this study.  
The focus of our market definition effort was the market for vocational qualifications, 
although we note that many of the AOs supplying qualifications in this space are also 
active in the supply of academic qualifications which means that there are clear 
interdependencies between the two markets and changes in the vocational qualifications 
space is likely to have an effect on the academic qualifications market also.  
The standard economic framework for defining markets 
Market definition is typically carried out using a standard CMA framework as shown in 
Figure 8. The approach is an iterative thought experiment, starting with the narrowest 
possible market definition and then checking if the existence of demand or supply 
substitution means that the scope of the market needs to be extended. The views 
35 
 
reached are based on a variety of evidence, both quantitative and qualitative evidence 
and judgements. Below we discuss each of the steps involved in more detail.  
 
Figure 8 Market definition framework 
 
Source: Frontier Economics 
Step 1 starts with a narrow definition of products and/or geography. In the case of 
vocational qualifications this would involve choosing a particular qualification, an 
associated Awarding Organisation and a level, for example City & Guilds ‘Working in the 
Health Sector’ at Level 2. 
Steps 2 and 3 then consider the extent of substitution between products and/or 
geographies from the perspective of customers and suppliers. For example, if products 
(i.e. the particular qualifications) are strong substitutes, they are considered as close 
competitors and therefore considered to operate in the same market. To make this 
assessment, we consider the following: 
• Demand-side substitution looks at the demand response of training providers to 
a “small but significant” increase in price (or equivalent reduction in quality) in the 
order of 5-10%. If the price of our product defined in Step 1 rose by 5-10% (or 
quality fell by 5-10%), would direct customers (training providers) switch to another 
product or geography in such numbers as to render the price rise unprofitable? 
• Supply-side substitution looks at the supply response of potential suppliers 
(alternative AOs) to a price increase, i.e. if the price of the product rose by 5-10%, 
could AOs offering other products easily (and profitably) switch to provide this 
product? 
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If either training providers or AOs would substitute in response to the price increase or 
reduction in quality, then our definition is too narrow and should be extended to include 
the product/geography they would switch to/from. 
As we highlight in the approach above, in some industries, including vocational 
qualifications, suppliers compete on a variety of dimensions, not only on price. Quality is 
often a basis of competition among suppliers (AOs) and a very important consideration to 
customers (training providers) in the vocational qualifications market. Therefore both 
price and quality were taken into account in our market definition framework.  
Steps 2 and 3 should be repeated until the market definition is broad enough such that 
no further demand-side or supply-side substitution should be possible. 
Step 4 is the final step which considers if, given the defined market scope, some 
customers may face different competitive conditions. If this is the case, customer 
segmentation may be necessary. We discuss customer segmentation in more detail 
below.  
Applying the market definition framework in the context of 
vocational qualifications 
In our market definition exercise, we define the AOs as suppliers, and training providers 
as customers. While learners, employers and HEIs are the end beneficiaries of 
vocational qualifications, for the purpose of our exercise we consider them only to the 
extent that their preferences impact on the decisions of the training providers who 
purchase qualifications from the AOs, and are thus the direct customers. 
  
There are three key dimensions to consider when applying the market definition 
framework in the context of vocational qualifications:  
 
1. Geography. Is the market for vocational qualifications national, regional or local? 
This involves asking questions like: 
• Demand-side: Do training providers purchase vocational qualifications from AOs 
in a regional, national or international market? 
• Supply-side: Does the price/quality of the product AOs offer vary by geography 
and is that related to how much competition they face in certain geographies? 
2. Product. Specifically, should the market be delineated by subjects, levels, 
elements of the product chain etc.? This involves asking questions like: 
• Demand-side: Do training providers purchase individual qualifications? Do they 
buy in bulk? Do they buy bundles? 
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• Supply-side: How easy/difficult is it for AOs to start offering qualifications in new 
subject areas, methods of learning (e.g. classroom based versus workplace 
based)? 
3. Customers. This involves considerations around whether the market should by 
delineated by the type of customers, and involves questions like: 
• Demand-side: Do different customer groups (training providers) have different 
purchasing preferences (e.g. some like to buy bundles while others prefer single 
qualifications)?  
• Supply-side: Do AOs price discriminate (significantly) between different 
customer groups?  
Below we present the evidence we have considered when defining the vocational 
qualifications market, working through the three dimensions identified above (geography, 
product, and customers).  
Our assessment included quantitative analysis, as well as reviewing the following 
documents: 
• Ofqual/ Frontier (2010) Report on the markets for regulated qualifications in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
• OFT (2011) Decision on the merger between Person PLC and Educational 
Development International PLC.  
• BIS/Frontier (2016) Understanding the Further Education Market in England. 
 
The qualitative evidence we discuss below derives from the above publications. We note 
that using evidence from publications which are several years old has its limitations as 
the market has undergone some change since then, but it is our view that many of the 
findings in the reports alluded to above are still relevant in today’s context. The market 
definition process and outcomes described below were also informed by a workshop we 
held with DfE policy officials. 
 
Our definition of the market draws together these sources i.e. our new quantitative 
analysis and our review of relevant published documents to propose a pragmatic and 
cautious market definition that can underpin our analysis of this market. In some cases 
we have used professional judgement to be able to interpret the evidence appropriately.    
Geography 
To determine the appropriate geography to define the market, we looked at AOs’ 
provision of qualifications across regions in England and found that a large number of 
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AOs serve multiple regions (Figure 9), which points against delineating the market at 
national level. 
We also note that the findings of OFT (2011), suggested that demand and supply 
conditions were similar across England and Wales. Also, Ofqual/ Frontier (2010) 
concluded that there is a single geographic market across England, Wales and Scotland. 
 
Figure 9 AOs providing qualifications in different regions 
 
Source: Frontier Economics using the ILR (2014/15). Regions defined as Government Office Regions 
(GORs), including Scotland and Wales 
We therefore conclude that for the purposes of this study, the market for vocational 
qualifications in England can be considered as national in scope. 
Product 
To define the appropriate product market, we consider the qualification subject, level and 
methods of learning (classroom based versus workplace based).    
Subject 
Demand-side substitution 
On the demand side, the first question to ask was how easy it is for training providers to 
switch to a different qualification in response to a change in price/quality. We found that 
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qualifications are sufficiently differentiated and demand is so subject-specific that there is 
little substitution between subject groups (Frontier 2010). Therefore training providers are 
unlikely to switch from purchasing (and offering) qualifications in one subject area to 
purchasing qualifications in another subject area as a result of an increase in price (or 
reduction in quality) from AOs. For example, an FE college will not switch from buying 
nursing qualifications to construction qualifications if the price of nursing qualifications 
goes up by 10%. 
Another consideration with respect to the demand-side is the extent of bulk buying 
among training providers. The rationale behind this is that, if training providers prefer to 
buy qualifications in bundles, even if the price of one of the qualifications goes up (or 
quality drops), they would not be likely to change supplier for only that individual 
qualification. Instead, if the issue were significant enough they would be likely to switch 
the whole bundle of qualifications they currently source from that supplier. For this 
reason, if customers consistently buy in bundles, defining the market at the individual 
qualification level is likely to be too restrictive.   
We found mixed evidence on whether training providers source all/ or multiple 
qualifications from one AO, or if they source from multiple AOs. In particular: 
• Most customers told OFT (2011) that when possible, they prefer to contract with 
AOs who can offer broad packages as this reduces administration costs. As such, 
competition among AOs might take place ‘for the market’ rather than ‘in the 
market’ (i.e. the AOs compete for the business of a training provider, rather than 
against other AOs for each qualification). This was particularly true for 
independent training providers and employers.   
• However, some FE colleges stated that they must procure from a number of AOs 
to be able to offer a wide portfolio of qualifications. Different departments make 
their own supplier choices, and colleges may procure from up to 20 to 30 AOs 
(OFT, 2011). 
The above evidence is mixed, but we conclude that a cautious approach is to define 
markets at the subject level.  
Supply-side substitution 
Regarding supply side substitution, the movement between subject areas by AOs is 
also limited; it does happen, but it appears to be more difficult than switching from a 
particular qualification within a sector to another qualification in that sector.  
Evidence was again mixed: some AOs said that entering a market with speed would be 
likely to require takeover of other AOs rather than being able to develop qualifications in 
new subject areas alone, while other AOs disagreed (Frontier, 2010).  
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OFT noted that a number of AOs supply across most sectors, and some AOs have been 
expanding into new sectors. However, Frontier (2010) pointed out that while some AO’s 
offer a range of awards, those which are involved in many areas had been for a long 
time. Frontier (2010) also found that most new qualification entry takes place in subject 
areas close to those the AO already offers. This is demonstrated by the fact that just 
under 4% of newly accredited qualifications between 2003 and 2009 were in subject 
areas in which the AO was not present in 2003. 
At the same time, OFT’s analysis revealed that smaller specialist AOs tend to make most 
of their revenues from a limited number of sectors (particularly where they are the 
recognised experts). 
Our analysis also showed there is considerable diversity in the scale and scope of AOs; 
some operate in many areas, while others operate in few. The majority of AOs operate in 
only one or two subject areas (as shown in Figure 10).  
We also find expansion into new subject areas is limited. Figure 11 categorizes all 
qualifications within subject areas into: 
• Qualifications which are established23 (and thus by default delivered by an 
established AO24);  
• Qualifications which are new but provided by an AO established in the subject 
area; and 
• Qualifications which are new and are provided by an AO new to the subject area.  
Subject areas are categorised at the level of Subject Sector Area (SSA) according to 
Ofqual’s classification system. There are 15 Tier 1 SSAs and 48 more granular Tier 2 
SSAs. 
Figure 11 illustrates that with the exception of Social Sciences, in most sector subject 
areas (SSAs) the newly developed qualifications are from established AOs. This 
suggests that entry of AOs into new subject areas is limited. 
                                            
 
23  Have been available for one or more years.  
24  One who has been supplying qualifications in the subject area for some time.  
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Figure 10 AOs providing qualifications in different SSAs Tier 1 
  
Source: Frontier Economics using ILR (2014/15) 
Figure 11 Change in qualifications 2010/11-2014/15 
 
Source: Frontier Economics using ILR (2010/11 – 2014/15) 
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Frontier (2016) pointed out two key constraints on the ability of AOs to switch between 
subject areas: 
• A good relationship with a Sector Skills Council (SSC) (or other influential 
employer-led organisation) is typically needed to start providing a qualification in a 
new subject area. This is because it helps to understand employers’ needs and 
acts as a gatekeeper to recognition by Ofqual. The ease of supply-side 
substitution will depend on how easy it is to develop such a relationship.  
• A network of customer relationships (i.e. with training providers) is important to 
successfully market the qualification. These relationships are a source of market 
intelligence on the demand for particular qualifications and also are a route to 
market for those qualifications. However, the importance of reputation in this 
sector acts as a barrier to supply-side substitution.  
Frontier (2016) further noted that even within the subject area, demand-side substitution 
is typically limited since demand tends to be very occupation specific (e.g. a qualification 
for a plumber is not substitutable for a qualification for an electrician). However, the key 
supply factors such as a good relationship with an employer-led organisation and a 
network of customers do not appear to be material limitations to supply-side substitution 
within a subject area. If anything, they facilitate expansion; customers often approach 
AOs with requests to develop new qualifications that meet specific needs.  
Furthermore, according to one stakeholder, AOs can offer a range of qualifications within 
one subject area because: 
• Inputs and resources can straightforwardly be sourced from a pool of trusted 
external specialists (industry experts) if no in-house expertise is available; and, 
• AOs often employ external verifiers to help assess the practical components of 
qualifications. 
As such, supply-side substitution within subject areas is more straightforward than 
between subject areas. 
Competitive dynamics 
As a last step in our analysis of defining the market by subjects, we explored how 
competitive dynamics (i.e. the nature of competition and the extent of entry and exit) vary 
between subject areas. This last step serves as a robustness check, as different 
competitive dynamics in different subject areas would help us confirm whether they 
should in fact be treated as separate markets.  
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• Our analysis showed that both the extent of entry and exit rates and the level of 
market concentration (Table 3) vary across SSAs. Table 3 illustrates market 
concentration within SSAs Tier 1 through the following metrics: HHI25 index which 
is the most commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated 
based on market shares of all the companies active in a market. The higher the 
index, the more concentrated the market is (i.e. the fewer the AOs).  
• Number of active AOs within each SSA. 
The table illustrates that, for example, market concentration in Maths and Science is 
much higher than in Business, Administration and Law – that is there are fewer AOs 
offering Maths and Science than Business Administration and Law. This confirms our 
earlier conclusions based on demand and supply side substitution because such varying 
market structures between the SSAs suggest that they are distinct markets.  
Table 3 Market concentration within SSAs  
Subject area HHI # of AOs active 
Health, public service, social care 1792 58 
Science Maths 3141 20 
Agriculture 2233 28 
Engineering and Manufacturing 1923 48 
Construction 2818 30 
Information Communication Technology 1467 26 
Retail and Commercial 2338 46 
Leisure Travel Tourism 2038 33 
Arts, Media, Publishing 2760 38 
History, Philosophy, Theology 2625 17 
Social Sciences 3768 16 
Languages, Literature, Culture 2434 15 
Education and Training 2341 28 
Prep for Life and Work 2360 52 
Business Admin Law 1191 64 
Source: Frontier Economics using ILR. Note HHI calculation presented in table equals the sum of squares 
of the market shares multiplied by 10,000 
Given all of the above evidence, we conclude that the sector appears to be delineated at 
subject level. Therefore in our further assessment of the market, we will look at sub-
markets by SSA Tier 2 (and if this is not possible for practical reasons, Tier 1). 
Level 
                                            
 
25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
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Vocational qualifications exist at different levels, ranging from entry level, right up to level 
8+. The previous evidence suggested that the vocational qualifications market was not 
delineated by the level of qualification offered. The OFT learned from stakeholders that if 
the training provider wanted to switch AOs, it was likely to do so for all levels of the same 
qualification implying little demand side substitution between levels. Likewise, the OFT 
found that when AOs introduce new qualifications, they tend to do it across all levels, 
implying little supply side substitution. The OFT also noted that the sets of suppliers do 
not vary significantly between levels, implying little variation in competitive constraints 
between levels.  This suggests that AOs operate across all FE levels when they offer 
vocational qualifications in a particular subject area. Segmenting the market by FE level 
is therefore not justified. 
Our analysis did not find any evidence to contradict these findings. We therefore think it 
makes sense, for the purposes of this work, to not delineate the market further by level of 
qualification.  Note that this analysis assumes that demand is from the training providers 
and not the learners. The latter’s perspective is considered below when we explore ‘age’ 
of learners.      
Elements of the product chain 
The offer of AOs around qualifications consists of three key elements: 
• Content development (i.e. the curriculum and assessment strategy) 
• Delivery support (e.g. support to the training providers) 
• Assessment (including delivering assessments and issuing the certificates) 
We considered whether it makes sense to separate the market by these elements, or to 
consider the whole package as a single market. It is our understanding that both AOs 
and training providers tend to treat all the elements of the product chain as a single 
product; suppliers offer them as one product, and training providers currently purchase all 
of these elements together from a single AO.  
We therefore conclude that, for the purposes of market definition, all the elements of the 
product chain are bundled together, and the market should not be delineated across 
these elements in our analysis. However, we note that some proposed reforms to the 
market involve separating out the product offer and could, as such, cause the market 
definition to look different in future. We consider these reforms in more detail in later 
chapters of the report. 
Methods of learning 
Qualifications are offered via a range of methods of learning. For example, work-place 
based apprenticeships and classroom-based vocational qualifications. We have 
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considered the extent to which the market definition should reflect the method of learning. 
Apprenticeships are shifting away from ‘frameworks’ to employer-led ‘standards’. A key 
difference between the former frameworks and the new standards is that the standard 
may not include a formal vocational qualification. Standards are developed by employers, 
often working alongside training providers, and are often highly occupation specific, or 
even firm-specific. Therefore, there is likely to be little substitutability across them on the 
demand side26. 
Indeed, apprenticeships are jobs which include formalised training; classroom-based 
vocational training is not a job but is intended to support the learner towards employment. 
Apprenticeships involve on-the-job training and off-the-job training (which could be in a 
college/provider classroom or workshop), both of which contribute to the achievement of 
specified vocational qualifications. Apprenticeships vary in the amount of classroom-
based learning, with those in areas such as engineering or accountancy requiring more 
traditional theory-based study than others, such as customer service. The extent of 
classroom-based learning usually increases according to the level of the apprenticeship 
and also in relation to the way particular vocational qualifications are designed. There is 
therefore likely to be some substitutability between apprenticeships and classroom-based 
vocational qualifications.  Furthermore, the degree of substitutability may grow over time, 
in light of the recommendation of the Sainsbury Panel that a single common set of 
standards should cover both apprenticeships and college-based provision.  
On the supply-side, there are differences across training providers, with some of them 
offering only classroom-based vocational qualifications, and others (although not many) 
offering only apprenticeship models of learning (this is shown in Figure 12). In addition, 
the composition of training providers who offer classroom based vocational qualifications 
varies from those training providers who offer apprenticeships. Fewer FE colleges and 
many more private training providers are active in the provision of apprenticeships (this is 
shown in Figure 13). 
A further reason why apprenticeships differ from classroom based vocational 
qualifications is that they are subject to certain attached conditions, so they are eligible 
for separate specific funding from SFA.  
 
                                            
 
26 We note however that the Sainsbury Panel has recommended that the Institute for Apprenticeships 
reviews all standards to ensure they are not firm, but occupation, specific. 
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Figure 12 Number of AOs providing different types of qualifications27 
 
 Source: Frontier Economics using ILR 
 
                                            
 
27 This chart refers to apprenticeship frameworks currently being delivered and not the new apprenticeship 
standards that are being introduced. 
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Figure 13 Composition of training providers offering classroom based vocational qualificaitons and 
apprenticeships 
  
Source: Frontier Economics using ILR 
Although classroom-based vocational qualifications and apprenticeships are substitutable 
for some learners, and this trend may accelerate in the future, they are not for other 
learners. To be cautious when undertaking our market analysis, we therefore conclude 
that it is appropriate to consider apprenticeships as a separate market28. It is recognised 
that a more nuanced approach to market segmentation could consider the sub-segments 
of the market where apprenticeships are substitutable for class-room based learning 
qualifications, but this is not considered necessary for the purposes of this analysis as we 
will consider apprenticeships separately.   
Age 
We have considered the extent to which the age of learners is relevant to market 
definition. 
The OFT (2011) believed that the competitive issues were similar across all age groups. 
However, they noted that public funding may differ by the relevant policy programmes, 
which target different age groups29.  
                                            
 
28 We note that one of the recommendations from the Sainsbury Panel is that apprenticeships and college 
based provision should be subject to a common framework of standards in future.  
29 We note that the evidence from the OFT is from 2011 so precedes any of the recent changes in the 
vocational qualifications market which have affected funding for KS4 qualifications and for adults. 
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As shown in Figure 14, most AOs provide qualifications for young people and adults and 
therefore would suggest a single market for all age groups.  
However, the policy landscape for the 16-19 and 19+ age groups differ substantially. The 
two age groups are funded differently, participation in 16-19 education or training is 
compulsory whereas this is not the case for 19+,  school sixth forms operate in the 16-19 
market but not  the adult one etc. Furthermore the reforms recommended by the 
Sainsbury Panel suggest a different approach to reform of the 16-19 market relative to 
the 19+ market.  
To ensure that our analysis is useful from a policy perspective, we have therefore taken 
the approach of delineating the sector by age of learners, with separate markets for 16-
19 year-olds and adult learners.  
Figure 14. AOs providing qualifications in different age groups 
 
Source: Frontier Economics using ILR 
Customer types 
To define the market, we consider training providers as the customer since they are the 
ones that purchase the right to deliver qualifications from AOs. There are a number of 
customer types (training providers) in the sector including: 
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• Schools; 
• Colleges; 
• Independent Training Providers; 
• Local Authorities; 
• Charities;  
• Employers; and 
• Others (such as Group Training Associations). 
In its assessment, the OFT considered the perspectives of different customer groups and 
suggested that customer segmentation was justified because of differing preferences. 
For example: 
• Colleges usually prefer obtaining a range of qualifications from single or multiple 
suppliers (sometimes with overlapping awards when certain brands/awards are 
‘must-haves’). 
• In addition to being a training provider, independent training providers often play 
the role of intermediaries between AOs and private employers. As such, they 
might require different products or services to a college.  
• Employers may wish to work with a single AO that best suits their training and 
learning needs. 
Our analysis also suggested some differences across customer types; in particular we 
found that larger training providers appear to obtain qualifications from a wider range of 
AOs (Figure 15) than smaller training providers. 
50 
 
Figure 15 Proportion of training providers of different sizes (number of learners) using particular 
numbers of AOs 
 
Source: Frontier Economics using ILR. Note: provider size here is used as a proxy for and customer type 
(e.g. FE colleges tend to be large in size)  
As such, we note some differences between customer types, and acknowledge that they 
merit some consideration in our market assessment. However, these differences do not 
appear strong enough to justify delineating the market by customer types.  
We therefore conclude the market should not be delineated by types of customers 
(training providers).  
Conclusions 
Market definition is an important stage in our assessment of how and to what extent 
competition in the market delivers vocational qualifications which are rigorous, 
recognisable, responsive and innovative. We reviewed a range of evidence in order to 
find a market definition which is informative and useful from a policy perspective.  
Given the above review, we define markets by their Tier 2 Sector Subject Areas (SSA), 
qualification type (classroom based vocation qualifications or apprenticeships) and by 
age group of learners, as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Defined markets in the vocational qualifications sector 
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5. Features of an effective vocational qualifications 
market 
Key findings 
• The Independent Panel on Technical Education (Sainsbury et al, 2016) made clear 
that if the vocational qualifications market were to be working effectively, then 
vocational qualifications would be : 
• Recognisable. A qualification is recognisable if all relevant stakeholders can 
quickly and easily identify learners’ skill levels. 
• Rigorous. A qualification is rigorous if all learners holding a particular 
qualification meet the required standard. 
• Responsive. Qualifications are responsive if their content remains relevant and 
responds positively to changing employer and learner demands. 
• Innovative. Qualifications are innovative if they are able to find new and better 
ways of meeting current or anticipated demand. 
• Tensions can exist between these four (RRRI) features, which mean that it may not 
be possible, or desirable, for all four to be demonstrated at once. In general there 
could be a trade-off between rigour and recognisability on the one hand, and 
responsiveness and innovation on the other. 
• When thinking about the performance of the vocational qualifications market 
against these features (as well as possible options for reform), it is important to 
reflect on which features are to be considered by policy makers to be most 
important in any given context. The extent to which each of the four features is 
important may depend on the type of qualification considered. 
• Further trade-offs exist when considering options for reform. For example, market 
features that deliver recognisable qualifications may not always align with those 
that deliver rigour (this is considered further in the next chapter).  
Features of an effective market for vocational qualifications 
A number of reviews of the vocational education system, notably the Wolf Report (2011) 
and the recent Sainsbury Panel (2016), have identified a range of aims for vocational 
qualifications. Firstly, vocational qualifications are intended to provide a measure of the 
skills and knowledge that an individual has acquired through training; this allows 
individuals to signal to employers their ability to work. For this to be the case, it is 
important that both learners and employers have good and accurate information about 
what different qualifications entail so that they can make informed choices about which 
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qualifications to pursue or which candidates to hire. Furthermore, for vocational 
qualifications to contribute to a productive and skilled workforce, they need to meet the 
dynamic needs of employers over time. Finally, to free up resources and provide the best 
possible service to learners and training providers, the system should encourage 
efficiency and be innovative. 
With this in mind, and to reflect these different aims, the features we would expect to 
observe if the market were working effectively are that qualifications should be: 
• Recognisable. A qualification is recognisable if all relevant stakeholders can 
quickly and easily identify learners’ skill levels. 
• Rigorous. A qualification is rigorous if all learners holding a particular qualification 
meet the required standard. 
• Responsive. Qualifications are responsive if their content remains relevant and 
responds positively to changing employer and learner demands i.e. this relates to 
what awarding organisations provide. 
• Innovative. Qualifications are innovative if assessment methods and the support 
AOs provide respond positively to changing demands or AOs are able to introduce 
improvements in the way they provide their services in anticipation of future 
demand i.e. this relates to how awarding organisations provide qualifications. 
In addition to these four (RRRI) characteristics, for the market to work well it would need 
to be transparent and operate in a cost-effective way. 
Potential tensions between these RRRI features  
There may be some tensions between the different aims for vocational qualifications 
such that it may not be possible to achieve all aims at once. For example, for 
qualifications to be recognisable, it may be desirable for the content of qualifications to be 
stable and unchanging. However, this could in some circumstances directly contradict the 
ability of qualifications to be responsive, particularly if employer and learner needs evolve 
over time. Similarly, fixed assessment methods may ensure a consistent standard and 
therefore promote rigour, but could potentially inhibit innovation in response to new 
technologies and demands. Consequently, some qualifications that exhibit certain RRRI 
features may fail to exhibit others, and that may be entirely appropriate. 
Given the potential for such trade-offs, it is important to consider which of the 
characteristics are most important for different parts of the market. For example, rigour 
may be more important than responsiveness in certain technical sectors in which 
standards remain constant over time (such as Accounting), whereas responsiveness may 
be more important in markets with rapidly evolving technologies (such as ICT for 
Practitioners). 
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In general there is likely to be a trade-off between rigour and recognisability on the one 
hand, and responsiveness and innovation on the other. In the following analysis, we 
therefore assess markets along both dimensions in a relative sense, rather than creating 
a ranking of markets along a single dimension. This allows for differences in the 
appropriate weight placed on the two sets of characteristics across different markets. 
Having defined the characteristics of vocational qualifications in a well-functioning 
market, the next chapter assesses the extent to which these characteristics or features 
are currently being observed in different parts of the market. 
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6. Market assessment 
This Chapter sets out a relative assessment of the different parts of the vocational 
qualifications market in England, using a set of indicators to measure the extent to which 
RRRI features are achieved across different subject areas. The analysis aims to illustrate 
the diversity of outcomes across the vocational qualifications market, which could guide 
consideration of potential options for reform. It also provides a foundation for further 
analysis on the factors that drive market outcomes, explored in the next Chapter. 
In this Chapter we focus on whether or not RRRI features are observed in the different 
segments of the vocational qualifications market. Our analysis is designed to assess the 
relative performance of subject areas within the wider market, rather than provide an 
assessment of the absolute performance of the market as a whole. The extent to which 
weaknesses exist throughout the market, and the potential drivers of those weaknesses, 
are explored in Chapter 7. 
Key findings 
• To assess the extent to which vocational qualifications in different parts of the 
market are delivering the RRRI features, we have drawn upon both quantitative 
and qualitative evidence. Our quantitative assessment is based on a set of 
indicators developed using a range of available data, including the Individualised 
Learner Record (ILR), the Employer Perspectives Survey (EPS) and the Employer 
Skills Survey (ESS). The selection of indicators has been tested through a 
workshop with DfE officials and sector experts, and our interpretation of the results 
has been tested with stakeholders from across the sector, including training 
providers, regulators, AOs and employers. 
• The set of indicators we have used for each of the RRRI features is shown on page 
62. Although we have used the best available data, we note that in some cases it is 
not straightforward to disentangle one measure from another. For example: 
• Rigour could be assessed using the indicator “% of learners in sustained 
employment 1 year after completing the course” because it implies learners with 
that qualification met the standard required of employers. However this could 
also be an indicator of recognisability because it implies the learner was able to 
signal his/ her level of skills such that the employer employed them. 
• Responsiveness could be assessed using the indicator “high % of employers 
think VQs are not relevant or available for their roles or skills” because it implies 
the content of vocational qualifications does not meet their needs. But it can 
also be considered an indicator of innovation as a lack of relevance could imply 
that skills are not being taught or assessed in an appropriate way. 
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• We have therefore assessed market performance along two RRRI dimensions (i) 
recognisability and rigour, and (ii) responsiveness and innovation. 
• Our indicator analysis in this Chapter provides an assessment of the relative 
performance of subject areas within the wider sub-market (adult general VQs, 16-
19 general VQs and apprenticeships), rather than an assessment of how the 
vocational qualifications market is performing as a whole.30 We find that 
performance varies across different parts of the market, for example: 
• ‘Technical’ subjects including Manufacturing Technologies, Engineering, 
Building and Construction and Accounting and Finance are relatively 
recognisable and rigorous, but not particularly responsive and innovative when 
compared to other subjects. However, this may reflect the relative importance of 
RRRI features to employers in these sectors. Stakeholders we interviewed did 
not express particular concern with the responsiveness of qualifications in these 
sectors, although some training providers and employer bodies we interviewed 
expressed a concern that smaller employers are not adequately represented in 
the design of qualifications31. 
• ICT subjects (ICT for Users and ICT for Practitioners) and subjects relating to 
arts and culture (including Performing Arts, Media and Communications and 
Languages, Literature and Culture of the British Isles) were relatively more 
responsive and innovative, but not necessarily as recognisable or rigorous as 
other subject areas. 
• Adult general VQs in Transport Operations and Maintenance and Retailing and 
Wholesaling appear to perform poorly on both recognisability and rigour, and 
responsiveness and innovation relative to other subjects. 
• The analysis illustrates how varied the vocational qualifications market is, and that 
vocational qualifications demonstrate RRRI features to different extents in different 
parts of the market. It is important to appreciate this diversity in understanding how 
the market works, and in considering policy options of reform that affect the market as 
a whole. 
• Further, the relative assessment in this chapter can be used to understand the 
potential drivers of weaknesses in the vocational qualifications market more generally, 
by analysing the correlation between relative performance and market features. This 
                                            
 
30 A purely quantitative assessment of absolute performance was not possible without international 
benchmarks or pre-specified thresholds for performance, which may not be robust. 
31 It is also possible that this is because employers regard these vocational qualifications as providing the 
basic underpinning competences that learners need to enable them to do the more occupation-specific 
training that the employers provide in the workplace. Hence, employers may accept the vocational 
qualifications can’t keep changing to keep pace with workplace change, which is in line with the Sainsbury 
Panel’s view. 
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is explored further in the following chapter (chapter 7), which uses correlation 
analysis, other quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence to assess the 
weaknesses in the current vocational qualifications market. 
Assessment of the extent to which vocational qualifications 
demonstrate RRRI characteristics 
This section sets out our approach to assessing the relative performance of different 
vocational qualifications against the RRRI characteristics and describes our results. 
Importantly, in this chapter we focus on whether the characteristics have been observed 
and not on the reasons why that might be the case. For example, we do not explore in 
this chapter whether the market’s performance can be attributed to AOs or qualifications, 
regulation, market structure or some other factor. The drivers of market weaknesses are 
considered in chapter 7 below.  
Assessing market performance using indicator analysis 
Data and methodology 
To assess the extent to which vocational qualifications demonstrate RRRI features, we 
use a number of indicators for each feature. The indicators are drawn from three main 
data sources: 
1. The Individualised Learner Record (ILR), which provides information on all 
publicly funded qualifications, including their subject area, duration, completion 
status, awarding organisation and training provider 
2. The Employer Perspectives Survey (EPS), a survey of 18,000 employers 
commissioned by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills' (UKCES). It 
covers all sectors of the economy, and includes information on how employers are 
meeting their skills and recruitment needs, including their approaches to 
recruitment, their awareness and use of vocational qualifications and 
apprenticeships, and their training and engagement with training providers 
3. The Employer Skills Survey (ESS), a survey of over 91,000 employers across all 
sectors commissioned by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills' 
(UKCES). It contains information on employers’ skills needs and training 
investment, including vacancies and skills shortages, employee and applicant skill 
gaps, and the recruitment of education leavers and young people 
For the purposes of our analysis, we have grouped individual indicators into aggregate 
indicators measuring particular aspects of RRRI. For example, responsiveness and 
innovation is measured by the extent of employer involvement in creating qualifications, 
the extent to which the supply of qualifications in a particular area matches employer 
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demand, and the extent of market entry. In turn, each of these aspects is measured by a 
number of specific indicators; for example, employer involvement is measured by 
whether employers participate in designing qualifications, and whether employers feel 
that qualifications can be adapted to their needs. The full list of indicators for each RRRI 
feature is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Indicators 
RRRI feature Aggregate indicator Sub Indicator Measure of poor performance 
Rigorous 
Performance 
improvement 
Business 
performance 
High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs improve business performance 
Ability to do 
jobs 
High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs improve staff’s ability to do jobs 
Productivity High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs improve productivity 
Preparation for 
work 
High % employers think college leavers are 
poorly or very poorly prepared for work 
Improve skills High % employers think staff had skills gaps 
because training did not improve their skills 
Perceived 
rigour 
High % employers think VQs are not as 
rigorous as other qualifications 
Changes over 
time 
Course 
duration 
Large % drop in average planned course 
duration 2010/11-2014/15 
Success rates Large % rise success rates 2010/11-2014/15 
Rigorous/ 
recognisable 
Destinations 
Sustained 
employment 
Low % of learners in sustained employment 1 
year after completing course 
Sustained 
learning or 
employment 
Low % learners in sustained learning or 
employment 1 year after completing course 
Increased pay High % employers think VQs rarely or never 
lead to increased pay 
Promotion or 
increased job 
status 
High % employers think VQs rarely or never 
lead to promotion or improved job status 
Recognisable Recognisability 
Fragmentation 
of AOs 
High fragmentation of AOs per qualification 
(reverse HHI) 
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Fragmentation 
of qualifications 
High fragmentation of qualifications within 
market (reverse HHI) 
VQs significant 
in candidates 
High % employers think having a relevant VQ 
is not significant in candidates 
Established 
VQs 
Low % of VQs in 2014/15 have existed in 
substantial numbers (no less than a fifth of 
2014/15 figures) since 2010/11 
Responsive-
ness/ 
innovation 
Employer 
involvement 
Adapted to 
business needs 
High % employers disagree with statement 
that VQs can be adapted to business needs 
Participation in 
design 
Low % employers in the sector helped design 
or set coursework 
Balanced 
demand and 
supply 
Relevant and 
available 
High % employers think VQs are not relevant 
or available for their roles or skills 
Cover all skills High % employers disagree that VQs cover 
all skills needed by company 
Skill shortage 
vacancies 
High % of skill shortage vacancies relative to 
all vacancies 
Lack of skilled 
applicants/ 
qualifications 
High % of employers with vacancies that 
have vacancies due to lack of skilled 
applicants or qualifications 
Jobs to 
qualifications 
ratio 
Low ratio of jobs to new qualifications 
(indicates over-supply of qualifications) 
Vacancies to 
qualifications 
ratio 
Low ratio of vacancies to new qualifications 
(indicates over-supply of qualifications) 
Market entry 
New 
qualifications 
High % of learners in 2014/15 on 
qualifications that existed in 2010/11 
New AOs High % of learners in 2014/15 with AOs that 
existed in 2010/11 
Source: Frontier Economics 
To make our observations about the performance of the market in relation to RRRI, we 
use a three-step process to flag vocational qualifications sub-markets that may not be 
adequately delivering each feature. The analysis assesses the relative performance of 
each subject area within the relevant sub-market – that is, we consider the sub-markets 
of adult general vocational qualifications, general vocational  qualifications for 16-19 year 
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olds, and apprenticeships, and assess the relative performance of subjects within each. 
The process is as follows: 
1. First, for each individual indicator we flag subjects that are in the bottom quartile of 
the sub-market in terms of performance, as potential poor performers relative to 
other subjects. Subjects in the bottom quartile are assigned a score of 1; all others 
are assigned a 0. 
2. We then use an average of all flags within each category to derive an aggregate 
indicator score. For example, for an aggregate indicator comprised of two individual 
indicators (such as employer involvement), a subject that is in the bottom quartile 
for one indicator but not the other is assigned an aggregate score of 0.5. 
3. Finally, we take the simple average (mean) across all aggregate indicators for 
recognisability and rigour, and for responsiveness and innovation, to derive an 
overall performance measure for the set of RRRI features. We assess markets 
separately along these two dimensions, rather than creating a ranking along a 
single dimension, to reflect the potential trade-offs outlined above. 
The approach of using multiple indicators means that we do not place undue weight on 
any single indicator. Instead, multiple sources of data are evaluated in combination. This 
is particularly important given the limitations of our data, set out in the following section.  
A lower score indicates better relative performance of a particular subject area. 
An illustration of our method for aggregating indicators is shown below. 
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Figure 17: Method of aggregating indicators 
 Source: Frontier Economics 
We have carried out sensitivity checks of the weighting of indicators, for example by 
giving all indicators equal weight rather than averaging across aggregate indicators. We 
have also carried out a sensitivity check using the ranking of subject areas within their 
sub-markets, rather than simply flagging those subjects in the bottom quartile in terms of 
performance. The latter tests whether the analysis is sensitive to the threshold used, that 
is, whether results would differ if we used the bottom third, for example, rather than the 
bottom quartile. Our results are not particularly sensitive to either specification. 
Therefore, the overall performance scores for recognisability and rigour, and for 
responsiveness and innovation, do not appear to be driven by the specification we have 
selected so our conclusions about relative performance are considered robust. 
Thresholds 
Thresholds for the bottom quartile in each indicator are given in the table below, which 
presents separate thresholds for adult general vocational qualifications, general 
vocational qualifications for 16-19 year olds, and apprenticeships. For example, a 
threshold of 5% in the first indicator means that if more than 5% of employers disagree 
with the statement that vocational qualifications improve business performance in a given 
subject area, the subject area is flagged as being a potential poor performer relative to 
other subjects. While the choice of threshold is itself arbitrary, the use of bottom quartile 
gives a wide dispersion of scores across the quadrants. And as we describe above, the 
assessment of relative performance is not sensitive to our choice of threshold. 
Destinations
Changes over time
Performance
Recognisability
Rigorous and 
recognisable
Sustained employment
Increased pay
Promotion/ job status
Sustained learning or employment
0
0
0
0
Course duration
Success rates
0
0
Ability to do jobs
Business performance
Productivity
Preparation for work
Improve skills
Perceived rigour
1
0
0
0
0
1
Fragmentation of AOs
VQs significant in candidates
Established VQs
Fragmentation of qualifications
0
1
0
1
3
Finally, we average across aggregate 
indicators to derive a performance 
measure for the RRRI objectives.
2
We then use an average of all flags 
within each category to derive an 
aggregate indicator score.
1
First, for each indicator, we flag subjects in 
the bottom quartile of the given market as 
potentially problematic.
Illustrative example – Adult general VQs in Hospitality and Catering
0.33
0
0
0.5
0.21
1 signifies that the subject is in the bottom 
quartile for this indicator – so a lower score 
indicates better performance
A lower score indicates 
better performance
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Table 5 Thresholds for low-performing indicators (bottom quartile) 
RRRI Aggregate indicator Indicator 
Flag if 
___ than 
threshold 
Threshold for low performance 
Adult 
general 
VQ 
Young 
general 
VQ 
Apprentic
eship 
R
ig
or
ou
s 
Performance 
improvement 
% Disagree: VQs 
improve business 
performance 
Higher 
5% 5% 5% 
% Disagree: VQs 
improve ability to do 
jobs 
Higher 
4% 4% 4% 
% Disagree: VQs 
improve productivity 
Higher 
7% 7% 7% 
% Training did not 
improve skills 
Higher 
4% 4% 4% 
% VQs not as 
rigorous as other 
qualifications 
Higher 
14% 14% 14% 
% College leavers 
poorly prepared for 
work 
Higher 
34% 34% 35% 
Changes 
over time 
Change in success 
rates 2010/11-
2014/15 
Higher 
16% 9% -1% 
Change in VQ 
duration 2010/11-
2014/15 
Lower 
-56% -18% 10% 
R
ig
or
ou
s/
 re
co
gn
is
ab
le
 
Destinations 
% Sustained 
employment 
Lower 
49% 41% NA 
% Sustained learning 
or employment 
Lower 
64% 70% 84% 
% Disagree: VQs lead 
to better pay 
Higher 
67% 67% 68% 
% Disagree: VQs lead 
to promotion or 
improved job status 
Higher 
76% 76% 76% 
R
ec
og
ni
sa
bl
e 
Recognisabil
ity 
Fragmentation of AOs 
per qualification 
Higher 
755  
                    
736 533  
Fragmentation 
qualifications per 
subject area 
Higher 
                    
60  
                     
43  171  
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% Established 
qualifications 
Lower 
22% 25% 7% 
% Relevant VQs not 
significant in 
candidates 
Higher 
48% 48% 48% 
R
es
po
ns
iv
en
es
s/
 in
no
va
tio
n 
Employer 
involvement 
% Disagree: VQs can 
be adapted to 
business needs 
Higher 
7% 7% 7% 
% Helped design or 
set coursework 
Lower 
3% 3% 3% 
Balanced 
demand and 
supply 
% VQs not relevant or 
available 
Higher 
20% 20% 20% 
% VQs do not cover 
all skills needed 
Higher 
21% 21% 22% 
% Vacancies due to 
skills shortage 
Higher 
30% 30% 31% 
% Vacancies due to 
lack of skilled 
applicants or 
qualifications 
Higher 
12% 12% 13% 
Jobs to new 
qualifications ratio 
Lower 
15.6  15.6  15.6  
Vacancies to new 
qualifications ratio 
Lower                  
0.3  
                  
0.3  0.3  
Market entry 
% Learners on new 
AO 
Lower 
4% 1% 2% 
% Learners on new 
qualification 
Lower 
29% 26% 13% 
Source: ILR, ESS, EPS 
It is worth noting that in some cases, thresholds differ between adult general vocational 
qualifications, 16-19 general vocational qualifications and apprenticeships, reflecting 
differences between these sub-markets. For example, there has been a sharp drop in the 
average duration of qualifications in the adult general vocational qualifications market 
between 2010/11 and 2014/15, a smaller drop in the 16-19 general vocational 
qualifications market, and a rise in the market for qualifications as part of 
apprenticeships. The thresholds reflect these differences: subject areas that have seen 
more than a 16% drop in duration fall within the bottom quartile for adult general 
vocational qualifications, whilst the threshold is just 9% for 16-19 general vocational 
qualifications and a 1% rise for apprenticeships.  
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Marked differences in thresholds across the sub-markets are also found in the following 
indicators: 
• The change in the average duration of qualifications – adult general vocational 
qualifications experienced large reductions in duration whereas apprenticeships 
experienced increases. 
• The percentage of learners going into sustained learning or employment – adult 
general vocational qualifications led to lower rates of positive destinations (1 year 
after completing their qualification) and apprenticeships to higher rates 
• The share of established qualifications and the percentage of learners on new 
qualifications – qualifications for apprenticeship tend to be newer. 
• The level of fragmentation (reflecting the extent to which multiple AOs and/ or 
qualifications exist in the market) – general vocational qualifications are more 
fragmented than apprenticeships in terms of the number of awarding organisations 
offering each qualification, but less fragmented in terms of the number of 
qualifications offered within each subject area. 
Findings of our indicator analysis 
A summary of the overall performance of subject areas in the adult general vocational 
qualifications market in terms of recognisability and rigour, and responsiveness and 
innovation, is given below. Summaries of the 16-19 general vocational qualifications and 
apprenticeships markets can be found in the annex, along with the performance of 
subject areas in each individual indicator in each of the three sub-markets. 
As indicators were awarded a ‘1’ if they were in the bottom quartile, this means that when 
we aggregate indicators to provide an overall assessment by subject area, subjects 
scoring closer to zero along either dimension are higher performing that those scoring 
closer to 1, i.e. the lower the score, the better the relative performance. 
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Figure 18: Relative performance for adult general VQs – relative performance quadrants32 
 
 Source: Frontier analysis using data from the ILR, ESS, EPS 
We have divided subject areas into four quadrants for ease of illustration, as seen above. 
The top right quadrant contains subjects that score relatively poorly on both 
recognisability and rigour, and responsiveness and innovation, and therefore give cause 
for concern. The bottom left quadrant contains subjects that are rarely flagged (in the 
bottom quartile) on either dimension of RRRI – this implies that they are less likely to be 
problematic, however this does not mean that they are the ‘highest scoring’ subjects in all 
indicators, if indeed such a thing can be defined. The bottom right and top left quadrants 
contain subjects that score relatively poorly on either recognisability and rigour, or 
responsiveness and innovation, but relatively well on the other dimension. This could 
reflect potential problems in the market; however, it could also result from the trade-off 
between RRRI features discussed above, and how particular elements of the RRRI 
characteristics may be more important for particular subject areas. 
An overall performance score of 0.3 was used as a dividing line for the quadrants. This 
was chosen in order to assign roughly equal numbers of subjects to the well-performing 
quadrant as to the three potentially poorly performing quadrants. We note that the 
                                            
 
32 Note that the horizontal axis spans 0-0.6, whilst the vertical axis spans 0-1. 
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dividing line was chosen for illustrative purposes, to more easily discuss groups of 
subjects, and does not as such have any underlying significance. Naturally, the subjects 
in each quadrant will be sensitive to the dividing line chosen. 
The two subject areas in the top right quadrant are Transport Operations and 
Maintenance, and Retailing and Wholesaling. Transport Operations and Maintenance 
qualifications scored particularly poorly on positive destinations, balancing supply and 
demand and market entry, in which they were flagged as being in the bottom quartile 
along all or almost all indicators. To give an indication of absolute performance, only 47% 
of learners in this subject area achieved sustained learning or employment (including 
self-employment), 21% of employers thought that VQs were not relevant or available, 
and only 3% of learners in 2014/15 were taking qualifications from a new AO (that 
entered the subject area after 2010/11). 
Retailing and Wholesaling qualifications performed relatively poorly across most 
aggregate indicators. Average course duration within Retailing and Wholesaling fell by 
85% between 2010/11 and 2014/15, and only 52% of learners achieved sustained 
learning or employment. Only 1% of Retailing and Wholesaling employers were involved 
in designing content, 31% had vacancies due to skills shortages, and only 7% of learners 
were taking qualifications from a new AO. 
Subject areas in the top left quadrant include Manufacturing Technologies, Engineering, 
Building and Construction, Hospitality and Catering and Accounting and Finance. These 
subjects appear to be relatively recognisable and rigorous, but not particularly responsive 
and innovative. It is worth noting that many of these subjects relate to ‘technical’ sectors, 
in which Professional Bodies have a strong presence. Their relative performance along 
the two dimensions may simply reflect the relative importance of recognisability and 
rigour, as opposed to responsiveness and innovation, by employers in the sectors. 
Indeed, stakeholders we interviewed as part of our qualitative research did not express 
particular concern with the responsiveness of qualifications in these sectors.  
However, it is worth noting that Manufacturing Technologies, Engineering and Building 
and Construction scored particularly poorly on employer involvement, with only 1-2% of 
employers involved in the design of content, and 8-11% of employers stating that VQs 
could not be adapted to business needs. Our qualitative research suggests that this may 
be because smaller employers are not adequately consulted by awarding organisations 
in these subject areas, and employer panels involved in designing qualifications tend to 
include representatives from predominantly larger firms. 
The bottom right quadrant of subject areas that are responsive and innovative, but not 
necessarily recognisable and rigorous, largely contains ICT subjects and subjects 
relating to arts and culture. ICT for Users and ICT for Practitioners scored particularly 
poorly on performance improvement and positive destinations; only 54% and 59% of 
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learners respectively achieved sustained learning or employment. Most subject areas in 
this quadrant scored poorly on changes over time, but this was particularly the case for 
the two arts subjects, Performing Arts and Crafts, Creative Arts and Design. Both saw a 
drop in average course duration of 60% between 2010/11 and 2014/15, whilst average 
success rates rose by 25% and 16% respectively.  
The bottom left quadrant contains subjects that are performing relatively well in terms of 
all RRRI features. As stated above, it is important to note that this means they have not 
been flagged as potential poor performers (in the bottom quartile) of many or any 
individual indicators, and not that they are the ‘highest scoring’ subjects in all indicators, if 
indeed such a thing can be defined. As such, the way to interpret subjects in this 
quadrant is that they do not appear to be performing relatively poorly in any dimension 
based on our indicator analysis, and not necessarily that they are the ‘top performers’ in 
the market. 
For example, Sports, Leisure and Recreation has an overall performance score of 0 
along both dimensions, which means that it was not in the bottom quartile of any RRRI 
indicators. However, this does not mean that it was the highest performing subject in all 
indicators: for example, 71% of learners in Sports, Leisure and Recreation achieved 
sustained learning or employment, which is high but not as high as in Medicine and 
Dentistry (85%). For other indicators, for example indicators on fragmentation or market 
entry, it is not clear what the optimal level should be. We can say that very high 
fragmentation or very low market entry is potentially problematic, but we cannot say that 
no fragmentation (only one AO and one qualification per subject) or 100% market entry 
(no learners on pre-existing AOs or qualifications) is desirable; therefore, we cannot 
compare Sports, Leisure and Recreation with other subjects that also have relatively low 
fragmentation and relatively high market entry.  
To reiterate, the aim of the indicator analysis is to make observations about the market 
and highlight areas of concern, and not to identify the ‘top performers’ in the market. 
It is worth noting that the distribution of subject areas across quadrants is generally 
similar for 16-19 general VQs and apprenticeships as for the adult general VQs 
described above. The notable exception is Retailing and Wholesaling apprenticeships, 
which score well among on all four RRRI dimensions. Retailing and Wholesaling 
apprenticeships appear to have become substantially more demanding over time, with 
average course duration increasing by 58% between 2010/11 and 2014/15, and average 
success rates falling by 24%. Positive destinations are particularly high, with 92% of 
learners moving into sustained learning or employment; and 16% of learners in 2014/15 
were taking qualifications from a new AO. 
Preparation for Work and Foundations for Life and Work are not included in the summary 
above, due to missing data from employer surveys. However, it is worth noting that both 
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score poorly on positive destinations, with 61% and 45% of learners moving into 
sustained learning or employment respectively. Both subjects also score poorly on 
changes over time, with average course duration falling by 20% and 65% respectively, 
and success rates rising by 7% and 18% respectively. The ILR data therefore suggests 
that these subjects may potentially be underperforming, although we do not have enough 
data to assess their overall performance. 
Limitations 
Our quantitative assessment of the market aims to explore the variation within the 
qualifications market and produce measures of performance in different parts of the 
market. It uses the best available data, but is subject to a number of limitations. A 
particular limitation is that it offers only a relative assessment of different subject areas 
within a particular sub-market, rather than an absolute assessment of performance. 
The difference in thresholds for the bottom quartile between adult general vocational 
qualifications, 16-19 general vocational qualifications and apprenticeships illustrates the 
fact that subjects that perform the same in absolute terms (for instance, subjects that see 
a 16% drop in duration) may be scored differently in relative terms across the three sub-
markets. Further, it is possible that all subject areas are performing well – or performing 
poorly – from an absolute standpoint, which would not be picked up by our relative 
approach. 
For an assessment of absolute performance at the sub-market level, we would either 
need international benchmarks along the same indicators or some predetermined 
thresholds for each indicator. The data was not available for international benchmarks, 
and it was felt that using predetermined thresholds would not be sufficiently robust. 
However, in the following chapter we use a range of both quantitative and qualitative 
sources to perform an absolute assessment of the vocational qualifications market as a 
whole (not at the level of individual sub-markets). 
For some markets and subjects, indicator data were not available at the appropriate level 
of detail. Some survey data could only be matched at the sector and occupation level (for 
example, Technical Professions in Manufacturing), rather than to the individual sub-
markets defined above. In these cases, outcomes in specific markets were proxied by the 
most appropriate sector-occupation data (for example, apprenticeships in Manufacturing 
Technologies being proxied by Technical Professions in Manufacturing), which means 
that certain indicators may be imprecisely matched for some market segments. 
Preparation for Work and Foundations for Life and Work could not be matched at all for 
indicators derived from employer surveys (ESS and EPS), which means that there were 
not enough indicators to form an overall performance score for these two subjects. 
Further, some data were only available for adult learners. 
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Data shortcomings mean that some individual indicators may not be adequately robust. 
We attempt to mitigate this by averaging individual indicators into aggregate indicators, 
and further aggregating these into an overall performance score for each RRRI 
dimension. It is therefore important to take each individual measure as indicative rather 
than conclusive; all indicators should be viewed alongside all other indicators of the RRRI 
outcome. 
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7. Assessment of market weaknesses 
In the previous chapter we presented analysis on the relative performance of different 
parts of the vocational qualifications market. This chapter focuses on the extent to which 
weaknesses exist in the market as a whole and the drivers of those weaknesses. 
To do this, we start from first principles and consider the incentives and capabilities of 
different stakeholders in the vocational qualifications market, including AOs, training 
providers, learners, employers and regulators. We then form a number of hypotheses on 
how these incentives and capabilities could prevent the desirable RRRI features from 
being achieved. We then test our hypotheses using a range of evidence including the 
following: 
• Quantitative analysis on the hypotheses (for example, if the data shows success 
rates rising and course lengths falling over time, and if AOs with higher success 
rates in one year attract more training providers the following year, this could 
suggest a race to the bottom in terms of rigour); 
• Quantitative analysis of the relationship between relative performance and 
observed RRRI features (for example, if segments of the market with less 
competition between AOs also have lower levels of innovation, this could suggest 
that a lack of competition inhibits innovation); and 
• Qualitative evidence from 35 semi-structured stakeholder interviews that directly 
address the hypotheses. 
We conclude the chapter with the potential weaknesses in the market, in particular 
discussing the role of market structure in preventing the RRRI features of vocational 
qualifications from being observed. Options for reforming the vocational qualifications 
market to improve recognisability, rigour, responsiveness and/ or innovation are 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
Key findings 
Our analysis has identified evidence of the following market weaknesses: 
• Misaligned incentives potentially lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of 
rigour – The importance of success rates as part of Ofsted ratings may provide an 
incentive for training providers to choose AOs and qualifications that are ‘easier to 
pass’. For both young and adult vocational qualification markets (but not the 
apprenticeships market), we observe a rise in success rates and a fall in course 
duration over time, and find that AOs that have higher success rates than their 
competitors in one year attract higher numbers of learners the following year. 
These findings are consistent with a race to the bottom in terms of rigour, though 
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we note other factors also drive training providers’ decisions and thus we cannot 
prove the link. 
• Insufficient content regulation potentially leads to lower rigour – The 
regulation of general vocational qualifications, which does not include regulation of 
curriculum content and assessment strategies, appears insufficient to prevent a 
race to the bottom in terms of rigour. In contrast, in the apprenticeships market 
where content is directly regulated through apprenticeship frameworks, we do not 
observe a race to the bottom. 
• High barriers to training providers switching between AOs in other parts of 
the market, potentially leading to lower rigour, responsiveness and 
innovation from AOs – Our stakeholder interviews suggested that high barriers 
to switching restrict effective choice by training providers between AOs even in 
sub-markets where multiple AOs exist. This analysis suggests there are multiple 
parts of the vocational qualification market where AOs operate in a way that is not 
constrained by competitors or a regulatory framework mimicking competitive 
pressure.  Our quantitative analysis, we found that a low rate of switching between 
AOs was correlated with lower levels of rigour, responsiveness and innovation. 
• Some smaller training providers lack the tools to navigate the system which 
potentially leads to lower rigour, recognisability, responsiveness and 
innovation – Some stakeholders expressed a concern that smaller training 
providers, in particular private providers, do not have the capacity or access to the 
appropriate tools to select qualifications that best meet their employers’ and 
learners’ needs. This is in contrast to FE colleges, which often have dedicated 
market research teams to monitor the market. In our quantitative analysis, we find 
that the share of private training providers in a sub-market is negatively correlated 
with RRRI outcomes i.e. the greater the proportion of smaller training providers in 
a sub-market, the poorer the overall performance of that market. 
• Smaller employers are often less likely to be represented in the development 
of vocational qualifications which potentially leads to lower responsiveness 
– Both our quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that smaller employers are 
less likely to be involved in designing qualifications than larger employers. This 
means that the qualifications provided may be less suited to their skills needs, 
where these are systematically different from the needs of larger employers. 
• Insufficient head-to-head competition potentially leads to lower 
responsiveness and innovation – Despite the proliferation of AOs in most 
segments of the market, competition between AOs at the level of individual 
qualifications is limited.  If this is the case, AOs may face limited incentives to 
provide high quality customer service and innovate in terms of technology and 
support. We find that head-to-head competition is correlated with higher 
responsiveness and innovation. Training providers we interviewed gave examples 
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of AOs in sub-markets with no alternative options that fail to innovate or respond 
to changing technologies. Stakeholders suggested that AOs often compete on the 
basis of the services they provide and their ability to offer innovative assessment 
methods, particularly in relation to some subject areas (e.g. by moving to online 
approaches). 
As a wider issue relevant for government policy (not directly linked to the RRRI features), 
our analysis also reveals that particularly at lower levels of study, a high proportion of 
learners take multiple qualifications at the same level. This suggests that learners may 
not face clear routes to progression and/ or sufficient incentives to progress onto higher 
levels of learning. 
Some of the weaknesses listed above could be addressed through incremental reforms; 
however it appears that a number of weaknesses are inherently linked to the competitive 
nature of the market for vocational qualifications. This is due to the complex nature of the 
vocational qualifications market, including a long customer chain and quality that is 
difficult to define and observe, as discussed in Chapter 2. In our assessment of policy 
options for reform in Chapter 8 below, we therefore focus our analysis on reforms to 
market structure. 
It is worth noting that the weaknesses above were identified and assessed in the context 
of an overarching assessment of the vocational qualifications market. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the sector is very diverse with different segments of the market facing different 
priorities and demonstrating the desired RRRI features to different extents. As such, not 
all of the weaknesses identified will be relevant in all segments of the vocational 
qualifications market, and it is important to consider the implications of overarching 
reforms to the market on different market segments. 
The rest of this chapter explores the stakeholders in the vocational qualifications market 
and the incentives they face which in turn drives their behaviour. We then consider a 
number of hypotheses relating to weaknesses in the vocational qualifications market that 
hinder RRRI outcomes being observed, and test these hypotheses using both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
Stakeholders in the vocational qualifications market 
The publicly funded vocational qualifications market consists of a large number of 
stakeholders, including: 
• Awarding organisations who are responsible for developing qualifications that 
qualify for public funding and meet the needs of training providers and employers. 
As independent organisations, they must ensure profitability and financial viability, 
which implies maintaining revenue by selling qualifications and reducing costs. 
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The strength of the profit motive will vary depending on the status of each AO, 
some of whom are private companies and many of whom are charities. 
• Training providers who purchase the right to deliver qualifications from AOs. 
Their public funding is affected by outcomes in terms of retention (16-19) and 
success rates (19+). Training providers must aim for a good Ofsted performance 
and other minimum standards such as financial viability in order to be eligible for 
public funding.  
• Learners who study towards qualifications to increase their chances of 
employment or continued education (HE or onward FE).33 They generally choose 
the training provider and not the AO.  
• Employers who employ learners with (or undertaking) vocational qualifications or 
pay for staff to undergo training. Some employers also work with training providers 
and AOs to design qualifications to meet their needs. They are likely to be 
sensitive to the price of staff training.  
• Regulators who regulate AOs and training providers. Ofqual is responsible for 
regulating the processes and financial viability of AOs supplying publicly funded 
qualifications, but does not regulate content directly. Ofsted is responsible for 
regulating training providers. Following inspections, Ofsted produces ‘ratings’ as 
an indicator of quality of training providers, with success rates and learner 
destinations among the key assessment metrics.  
• Central government which sets and implements policy on which qualifications 
are funded, and delivers funding to eligible training providers. The structure and 
incentives in funding will in turn affect training providers’ (and employers’) 
behaviour. 
The interactions between the different stakeholders in the publicly funded vocational 
qualifications market are summarised below. The incentives and capabilities of each 
stakeholder group, and the ways in which they could potentially lead to negative 
outcomes (adverse effects), are discussed in the following section. 
                                            
 
33 Under Raising the Participation Age (RPA) all young people are expected to continue in education or 
training until their 18th birthday. 
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Figure 19: Interaction of parties in the vocational qualifications market 
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delivers. In some cases, these incentives can lead to negative outcomes (adverse 
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consider the incentives and capabilities of each type of stakeholder in detail, to form 
hypotheses about potential weaknesses in the vocational qualifications market. 
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service, teaching and learning support and/ or limiting technological innovations. Another 
way is by being slower to adapt to changing employer demands, for example not 
refreshing content to reflect changes in technology. 
Many AOs are charities, which may dilute their profit motive. In particular, in some 
sectors the Professional Body of the sector (for example the Association of Accounting 
Technicians in Accounting) also acts as an AO. In these cases, the supplier of 
qualifications (the AO) also represents the ultimate consumers of qualifications (the 
employers)34. 
The incentives facing and capabilities of AOs could potentially give rise to the following 
weaknesses: 
• AOs may reduce costs by reducing innovation, in particular in the quality and level 
of service provided, or by reducing responsiveness by adapting more slowly to 
changes in employer demands. This is particularly likely in segments of the market 
where training providers have few AOs to choose from, as they are less able to 
switch to other AOs. 
• Qualifications in sectors without Professional Bodies may be less recognisable, 
rigorous and responsive to employer needs. This would be the case if the 
incentives of AOs are more closely aligned with those of employers in sectors with 
Professional Bodies, and/ or if AOs were better informed of employer needs in 
these sectors. 
Training providers  
Training providers receive public funding based on the number and type of learners 
recruited, retention (for 16-19 year olds) and success rates (for 19+ year olds). Their 
Ofsted rating is affected by their retention and success rates, as well as the destinations 
of their leavers (whether they are in sustained learning or employment after completing 
the qualification)35. They therefore have an incentive to maximise recruitment as well as 
their learners’ success rates. 
Our stakeholder evidence suggests that training providers aim to meet their learners’ 
needs by choosing qualifications that suit them and prepare them for further education or 
employment. As such, training providers serve as ‘gatekeepers’ between AOs and the 
end consumer. However, in many markets there are a very large number of qualifications 
                                            
 
34 Where the professional body plays this dual role, there clearly needs to be a separation of these two 
functions. 
35  Only a small proportion of the qualifications eligible for public funding will count in performance 
tables, which will directly influence their choice of qualifications.  
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available, which means that training providers may lack the capacity to monitor the entire 
market to identify the most suitable ones for their learners. Further, if training providers 
spend a high proportion of their costs on AOs, they may have an incentive to choose low-
price qualifications at the expense of rigour, recognisability and/ or responsiveness. This 
is more likely in markets with a high proportion of private training providers, for whom 
qualifications account for a much larger share of their costs (around 10%) than for 
colleges (around 2-3%). 
Stakeholders suggested that training providers face substantial costs when switching 
AOs, due to the costs of running multiple qualifications in the transition period, re-training 
staff and the costs of building a relationship with a new AO. Further, training providers we 
interviewed suggested that different AOs typically place different requirements on training 
providers, which means that switching AOs may entail substantial investments to meet 
new quality assurance processes. 
The incentives and capabilities of training providers could potentially lead to the following 
weaknesses in the market: 
• The importance of success rates to funding may lead training providers to choose 
qualifications and AOs that are ‘easier to pass’, rather than those that are more 
rigorous or suited to the needs of learners and employers. This could lead to a 
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of rigour, particularly if the content of qualifications is 
not regulated (discussed below). 
• Because of the wide range of qualifications available in some markets, smaller 
and/ or less informed training providers (without the scale needed for dedicated 
market research teams) may find it difficult to select qualifications and AOs that 
best meet their needs. Further, private training providers may place more 
emphasis on price than quality in selecting qualifications (compared to colleges), 
since qualification-related costs account for a higher proportion of their overall 
costs. In both of these cases, we would expect worse performance against some 
or all of the RRRI features. 
• Barriers to switching AOs may prevent training providers from exercising choice 
between AOs, even in segments of the market in which multiple AOs are present. 
This could lead to lower responsiveness and innovation on the part of AOs. 
Learners and employers 
Learners seek vocational qualifications to increase their chances of employment, career 
progression or continued education. However, stakeholders suggest that they may not 
always be informed about the best options available. Given the proliferation of 
qualifications in some subject areas, there may not be clear routes to progression in 
terms of one qualification leading to another (for example, a Level 2 qualification clearly 
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and directly following from a Level 1 qualification). Further, under the current system it is 
possible to obtain public funding for multiple qualifications at the same level without 
progressing onto higher levels of learning.  
Our stakeholder evidence suggested that employers would prefer the learners they hire 
to take qualifications that closely match the skills and competencies required in their jobs. 
However, as the content and assessment of qualifications is generally set by AOs, in 
most cases employers can only influence content and assessment methods through 
engagement with AOs (the exception is the apprenticeships market, in which employers 
will engage directly in setting the new apprenticeship standards). The capability of 
employers to actively engage in designing qualifications will depend on their size, due to 
the resources required. Larger employers are also likely to have more incentive to 
engage, as the cost of engagement is roughly independent of size whilst employers 
hiring a larger number of learners would derive more benefit from engagement. Further, 
in selecting representatives to their employer panels AOs are likely to favour larger 
employers, who would be likely to hire a larger number of the AOs’ learners. 
The incentives and capabilities of learners and employers could potentially give rise to 
the following weaknesses: 
• Some learners may take multiple qualifications at the same level without 
progressing onto higher levels of learning, due to a lack of clear routes to 
progression (given a proliferation of qualifications) and/ or insufficient incentives to 
progress. 
• Smaller employers may be less likely to be involved in designing qualifications, 
which may mean that qualifications in the market are less responsive to the skills 
needs of smaller employers, which matters if these differ from the needs of larger 
employers. 
Regulators 
Ofsted regulates training providers through inspections. Achievement, retention and 
success rates are key metrics in Ofsted ratings. Following inspection Ofsted produces 
‘ratings’ which are a key indicator of quality for training providers, which has implications 
on the ability of training providers to attract learners (and therefore generate revenue) 
and, in the case of private training providers, direct implications on eligibility for SFA 
funding. 
Ofqual regulates the process and financial viability of AOs, to ensure compliance with the 
General Conditions of Recognition (the Conditions). An AO must meet the Conditions to 
be recognised by Ofqual, which has serious implications on the ability of training 
providers to attract public funding when using that AO. The Conditions apply to the 
processes AOs take in designing and delivering qualifications (for example, requiring 
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AOs to engage with employers), but crucially do not apply directly to the content of 
qualifications offered by AOs for general vocational qualifications. However, the 
regulatory system for apprenticeships has changed in recent years, such that the content 
of apprenticeships is directly regulated through apprenticeship frameworks. 
AOs are responsible for setting the standards of training providers: in accordance with 
the Conditions, AOs will check whether the training provider has a robust internal quality 
assurance system to maintain the consistency and accuracy of assessments. In most 
cases, AOs will also conduct external quality assurance visits to ensure that training 
providers are meeting required standards. 
However, some training providers may be awarded Direct Claims Status (DCS), which 
allows them to directly claim credit certificates for their learners without the need for an 
external quality assurance visit from the AO. This gives the internal quality assurer 
greater control over the process for checking and approving awards, which may bring 
some administrative benefits. AOs have their own criteria for awarding DCS, and usually 
require training providers to have achieved successful consecutive number of external 
quality assurance visits from the AO, have a working internal review system and have 
good financial standings. DCS status is not regulated by Ofqual; nor is there a current 
record of which training providers hold DCS status. 
The incentives and capabilities of regulators may potentially result in the following 
weaknesses in the market:  
• The focus of Ofsted inspections on achievement and retention (which together 
determine success rates) may induce training providers to select qualifications and 
AOs that are easier to pass, potentially driving a ‘race to the bottom’ as discussed 
above. 
• The limits to Ofqual’s remit, in particular the lack of direct content regulation for 
general vocational qualifications, may mean that current regulation is not sufficient 
to prevent a race to the bottom. 
• The use of DCS may further reduce rigour if training providers to not adequately 
maintain standards, especially given incentives on training providers to maximise 
success rates. 
Hypotheses on market weaknesses 
Our analysis of the incentives and capabilities of key stakeholders allowed us to form a 
number of hypotheses about potential weaknesses in the market, which limit the ability of 
the market to deliver against one or more desirable RRRI features. 
Table 6 Hypotheses on market weaknesses 
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Hypothesis RRRI outcome affected 
1. There may be a race to the bottom in terms of rigour, if training 
providers choose qualifications and AOs that are easier to 
pass to maximise success rates 
Rigour 
2. The race to the bottom may be prevented or mitigated in the 
market for apprenticeships, where content is regulated through 
apprenticeship frameworks. However, this may not be the case 
in for general vocational qualifications, as Ofqual does not 
directly regulate content. 
Rigour 
3. The use of Direct Claims Status may further reduce rigour and 
drive a race to the bottom, if assessment standards are not 
appropriately maintained by colleges or monitored by AOs. 
Rigour 
4. Barriers to switching AOs may prevent training providers from 
exercising choice between AOs, even in segments of the 
market in which multiple AOs are present. This means that 
AOs may not select the most suitable qualifications for their 
learners and employers. 
Responsiveness 
and/ or 
innovation 
5. Smaller training providers may lack sufficient resources to 
navigate the market, whilst private training providers may place 
more emphasis on price rather than quality. This may result in 
poorer outcomes in parts of the market with a high share of 
such providers. 
Any/ all RRRI 
outcomes 
6. Smaller employers may be less likely to be involved in 
designing qualifications than larger employers, which may 
mean that qualifications in the market are less responsive to 
their skills needs. 
Responsiveness 
7. Segments of the market with high levels of concentration 
(fewer AOs to choose from) may be less responsive and/ or 
innovative, as AOs are able cut costs by reducing levels and 
quality of service and/ or adapting more slowly to employer 
demands without losing training providers. 
Responsiveness 
and/ or 
innovation 
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8. Subjects without Professional Bodies may be less 
recognisable, rigorous and/ or responsive, if AOs that are also 
Professional Bodies are more closely aligned with employers 
(in terms of their incentives), and/ or better informed of 
employer needs. 
Recognisability, 
rigour and/ or 
responsiveness 
 
Further, as a more general weakness in the market (not directly related to RRRI metrics), 
we hypothesise that some learners may fail to progress onto higher levels of learning. In 
particular, some learners may take multiple qualifications at the same level due to a lack 
of clear routes to progression and/ or insufficient incentives to progress. 
The above hypotheses are based on a first principles analysis of the incentives facing 
stakeholders in the market. In the following section, we test these hypotheses using a 
range of quantitative and qualitative evidence. 
Analysis of market weaknesses 
We test our hypotheses on potential market weaknesses using a range of evidence. In 
particular, we draw on: 
• Quantitative analysis directly testing the hypotheses. For example, if the data 
shows success rates rising and course lengths falling over time, and if AOs with 
higher success rates (than its competitors) in one year attract more training 
providers the following year, this provides evidence supportive of the ‘race to the 
bottom’ hypothesis. 
• Quantitative analysis of the relationship between relative performance and market 
features. For example, if segments of the market with high levels of concentration 
(fewer AOs to choose from) also have lower levels of innovation, this provides 
evidence supportive of the hypothesis that concentration reduces innovation. 
• Qualitative analysis of 35 semi-structured stakeholder interviews that directly 
address the hypotheses. Stakeholders interviewed included regulators and a 
cross-section of training providers, AOs and employers/ employer bodies of 
different sizes, subject areas and locations. 
Our analysis found little or inconclusive evidence to support hypotheses 3 and 8 in Table 
6: 
• Hypothesis 3: The use of DCS may further reduce rigour. Based on our 
interviews, DCS appears to be very widespread, with some training providers 
using DCS for the majority of their qualifications. However, as data on DCS is not 
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centrally held, it was not possible to quantitatively test the impact of DCS on 
rigour. Further, our stakeholder interviews suggest that DCS provides substantial 
benefits to training providers in terms of flexibility and control over assessment 
timings, but lack of evidence about the impacts on RRRI outcomes means that we 
cannot robustly test this hypothesis.  
• Hypothesis 8: Sectors without Professional Bodies may be less rigorous, 
recognisable and/ or responsive. Most training providers we interviewed felt that 
Professional Bodies are the natural choice of AO where they exist, as they are 
preferred by employers. This implies higher rigour, recognisability and/ or 
responsiveness in sectors with Professional Bodies. However, our quantitative 
analysis contradicts this finding, as the market share of Professional Bodies 
(indicating the prominence of Professional Bodies in a sector) is negatively 
correlated with both rigour/ recognisable and responsive/ innovative indicators. 
This could suggest a number of possible issues, including perceptions of quality 
not being aligned with actual quality, and the reputation of the AO being trusted at 
the expense of an objective assessment of rigour by employers and training 
providers. Given the apparent contradiction in findings between our quantitative 
evidence and our qualitative evidence, we cannot robustly test this hypothesis. 
However, where Professional Bodies act as the AO for the sector, we believe that 
there should be a clear separation of these different functions. 
We find some evidence supporting the remaining hypotheses in Table 6, as well as the 
hypothesis that learners may face insufficient incentives and/ or ability to progress onto 
higher levels of learning. Details on our findings and the analysis we conducted is 
described below. 
Finding 1: Misaligned incentives could lead to lower rigour i.e. a potential ‘race to 
the bottom’ 
We used a combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative interviews to test this 
hypothesis. First, if a race to the bottom were taking place, we would expect to observe a 
substantial and sustained increase in pass rates and a corresponding drop in course 
durations over time. Based on data over the past 4 years, we find that this is indeed the 
case for almost all adult general VQ markets, as shown below. It is worth noting that the 
observed trend does not apply to apprenticeships, which have generally become longer 
and more ‘difficult’ to pass over the past 4 years, likely due to changes in regulatory 
requirements. 
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Figure 20: Change in duration by subject for adult general VQs, 2010-11 – 2014-15 
 
 
Source: Frontier analysis of ILR data 
Figure 21: Change in success rate by subject for adult general VQs, 2010-11 – 2014-15 
 
 
Source: Frontier analysis of ILR data 
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The fall in duration per learning aim appears to be due partly to learners taking shorter 
qualifications, and partly to individual qualifications becoming shorter. Even without any 
changes in difficulty, we would expect shorter courses to be associated with higher 
success rates, as there is less time for learners to drop out of the course. To isolate 
changes in ‘difficulty’ from changes in duration, we further explore changes in 
achievement rates, which measure the proportion of passes among learners who take 
the assessment (that is, learners who do not drop out). We find an increase in 
achievement rates over time,36 particularly among qualifications for which there are 
multiple competing AOs. Our findings are as follows: 
1. We find a modest increase of 0.3 percentage points per year in average 
achievement rates across all qualifications between 2010/11 and 2014/15. In 
particular, focusing on qualifications that remained in use between 2010/11 and 
2014/15 (controlling for changes in the composition of qualifications over time); we 
find a marked rise in achievement rates of around 1.1 percentage points per year. 
2. The rise in achievement rates is considerably stronger where multiple AOs offer the 
same qualifications, that is, where there is head-to-head competition at the 
individual qualification level. In qualifications with multiple AOs, average 
achievement rates rose by 1.3 percentage points per year, compared to 0.4 
percentage points per year among qualifications with only one AO. This could be 
considered consistent with competition driving a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of 
rigour, though we note that there are other factors that drive achievement rates 
(see below). 
We note that trends across the market as a whole do not necessarily hold for each 
individual qualification. For example, course duration fell and success rates increased for 
qualifications in Level 2-3 Manufacturing Technologies and Level 1 Preparation for Life 
and Work. However, in Level 4+ VQs in Accounting and Finance, and Level 2-3 VQs in 
Building and Construction, course duration increased and success rates fell for individual 
qualifications between 2010/11 and 2014/15. 
We further tested the ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis by analysing how training provider 
behaviour correlates with changes in AO achievement rates. We find that AOs that have 
higher achievement rates than their competitors – in particular qualifications in a 
particular year – experience an increase in their market share the following year. Based 
on our analysis, a 1 percentage point higher achievement rate is associated with a 0.4 
percentage point increase in market share the following year. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis of training providers offering qualifications from AOs that are ‘easier to pass’, 
in order to maximise their achievement rates.  
                                            
 
36 This analysis considers the whole range of vocational qualifications, so does not disaggregate by market 
segment. 
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However, it is worth noting that rising success and achievement rates do not necessarily 
indicate falling rigour as they may reflect more accessible materials, better teaching and / 
or higher ability learners instead or as well. Similarly, falling duration may reflect a move 
towards multi-unit programmes of learning rather than falling rigour. We can therefore 
only conclude that our quantitative findings could be consistent with a ‘race to the bottom’ 
in terms of rigour, and not that they are definite proof of such dynamics. 
In our qualitative research, we heard evidence of some AOs being perceived as ‘easier to 
pass’ than others. We also heard evidence of training providers switching AOs to improve 
their learners’ success rates; however, in these cases it was not clear that this is 
associated with declining rigour, rather than previous AOs having less appropriate 
assessment methods. We note that the stakeholders we interviewed (in particular, 
training providers and AOs) may not have an incentive to provide examples of switching 
to ‘easier to pass’ AOs. 
Finding 2: Insufficient content regulation could lead to lower rigour 
Whilst Ofqual regulates the process through which AOs develop vocational qualifications 
(for example AOs are required to engage employers in the design of qualifications), the 
content of vocational qualifications is not currently regulated. Given the incentives 
described above on training providers and AOs, this regulatory approach does not 
appear to sufficiently mitigate a race to the bottom in terms of rigour. 
Evidence on the apprenticeships market highlights the importance of content regulation 
in maintaining rigour. As noted above, average durations have increased and success 
rates fallen in almost all segments of the apprenticeships market over the past four years. 
This is shown the figures below. 
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Figure 22: Change in duration by subject for apprenticeships, 2010-11 – 2014-15 
 
Source: Frontier analysis of ILR data 
Figure 23: Change in success rate by subject for apprenticeships, 2010-11 – 2014-15 
 
Source: Frontier analysis of ILR data 
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apprenticeships, in particular minimum requirements introduced in 2012 including but not 
limited to the following37: 
1. A minimum length: all apprenticeships for 16-19 year olds are required to last at 
least one year. The same applies for 19 and over unless prior learning or 
attainment has been recorded. 
2. Minimum guided learning hours: all apprentices need to spend at least 280 
guided learning hours in their first year, of which 100 hours or 30% (whichever is 
greater) must be delivered off-the-job. 
3. Minimum employment hours: all apprentices must be employed for a minimum 
of 30 hours a week except in exceptional circumstances. 
4. Maths and English: all apprenticeships are required to offer training to Level 2 in 
Functional Skills or English and Maths, if the apprentice does not already have 
these or equivalent qualifications. 
5. Quality requirements: government introduced safeguards designed to strengthen 
the monitoring and reporting process, including an ‘enquiry panel’ to manage poor 
quality training providers with the right to impose sanctions on sub-standard 
training providers. 
The fact that content regulation of apprenticeships appears to have increased rigour over 
the past few years suggests a key role for regulation in maintaining rigour within a 
competitive qualifications market. In contrast, regulation of the general VQs market by 
Ofqual does not appear to have been sufficient to prevent a race to the bottom. 
Finding 3: High barriers to switching AOs in other parts of the market could lead to 
lower responsiveness and innovation. 
Our qualitative evidence suggests that barriers to switching AOs may be high, even in 
markets with a large number of AOs. This means that training providers often face a 
limited choice of AOs, even in segments of the market where multiple AOs exist. Issues 
raised by our stakeholders include the following: 
• Most of the training providers we interviewed suggested they felt well informed 
about the qualifications that are on offer. However, some training providers 
(including large providers) indicated that they only choose from a restricted range 
of established AOs rather than the full range of AOs in the subject area. 
• All training providers we spoke to reported that they review the qualifications they 
offer continuously, which may or may not prompt a switch of AO. The evidence 
                                            
 
37 House of Commons Briefing Paper, Apprenticeships Policy, England 2010-2015, 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7278/CBP-7278.pdf  
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from these interviews suggested that switching AOs is usually prompted by some 
significant event such as change in course content or assessment method, high 
failure rates among students, or changes to the qualifications offered by their 
current AO. Prices are not typically seen as a factor in the decision to switch 
(though costs of delivering qualifications to the training provider could be). 
• Training providers we interviewed suggested that effective relationships with AOs 
are crucial because it allows them access to the required support and ensures that 
problems can be sorted out swiftly. This limits the ability to switch to some extent – 
though many larger training providers use multiple AOs within a given subject area 
and so are able to switch between AOs with which they have longstanding 
relationships. Even so, there are substantial costs to switching AOs, including to 
the costs of running multiple qualifications in the transition period, re-training staff 
and other administrative costs. 
Since barriers to switching may be high even in markets with a large number of AOs, 
measures of market concentration may mask the actual degree of choice training 
providers have between AOs. We explored the extent of switching observed in practice 
as a proxy for the existence of barriers to entry (explained in the annex),38 and found that 
higher levels of switching were associated with better outcomes in terms of 
responsiveness and/ or innovation. This suggests that barriers to switching (which reduce 
switching rates) would be likely to reduce the responsiveness of AOs and the level of 
service they provide to training providers. The finding corroborates our hypothesis 
(discussed later) that facing competition at the level of individual qualifications appears to 
be positively associated with an AO’s quality of customer service and technological 
innovations. 
Finding 4: Smaller training providers may lack the tools to navigate the system 
which could lead to lower rigour, recognisability, responsiveness and innovation. 
Training providers are intermediaries between learners and awarding bodies, and are 
directly responsible for which qualifications are offered. But they may have different 
capabilities to select the most appropriate qualifications for their learners (and 
employers), and/ or may place different emphasis on quality and price. For example: 
• Colleges typically use a range of AOs, often multiple AOs within a subject area. 
Based on our qualitative evidence, colleges (in particular large colleges) often 
have specialised teams conducting market research on the full range of 
                                            
 
38 We measured switching at the qualification title level – identifying for each training provider and 
qualification the AO they used in 2010/11 and in 2013/14, and comparing ‘switchers’ with those continuing 
with the same AO for particular qualifications. We note that this could in some cases understate the ‘true’ 
extent of switching, as training providers might switch to totally different qualifications. 
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qualifications. We were told by some AOs and colleges that larger colleges can 
have some power to influence the qualifications offered by AOs, for example by 
asking them to supply a new qualification, amend content or enter a new sector 
where the college is dissatisfied with its current AO. Based on our interviews, AO 
costs typically account for a very small proportion (around 2-3%) of the total costs 
of colleges; colleges do not therefore tend to choose qualifications based on price. 
• Private training providers typically have fewer learners, narrower subject 
offerings and transact with fewer AOs. Unlike colleges, they do not tend to have 
bargaining power over AOs. Evidence from our interviews suggests that AO costs 
could account for around 10% of the costs of private training providers, and as 
such they may place relatively more emphasis on price than colleges39. 
Our qualitative evidence suggests that smaller training providers and in particular private 
training providers find it more difficult to keep track of the full range of qualifications on 
offer, partly due to a lack of dedicated market research teams. They also tend to have 
less influence on the content of qualifications – though it should be noted that only a few 
large colleges reported being able to influence content in any way. Quantitatively, we find 
that provision by colleges has a statistically significant relationship with better rigour and 
recognisability, whereas the opposite relationship is found for private training providers.40 
This analysis is described in more detail in the annex. 
Finding 5: Smaller employers are typically insufficiently represented in the 
development of vocational qualifications which could lead to lower 
responsiveness. 
Interviews with stakeholders have revealed a concern among smaller employers and 
training providers that AOs and government have historically been focused on large 
employers, which has led to qualifications which typically suit the needs of large 
employers better than those of smaller employers. For example, one stakeholder 
mentioned that the skills required for culinary staff in large high-end restaurants are very 
different from the skills required in small bistros. 
The design of new apprenticeship standards (under the government’s ‘Trailblazers’ 
initiative) is a good example of this, where many small employers do not have the 
resources to commit to developing a new standard that meets their needs. Further, 
smaller employee numbers mean that they are less likely to be seen as attractive for 
                                            
 
39 It is worth noting that the FE market is characterised by a significant degree of subcontracting where 
colleges may subcontract considerable levels of activity to private training providers. As such, some of the 
results observed in relation to private training providers may also capture college behaviour where there is 
subcontracting. 
40 Note that our analysis on this issue focuses on the general vocational qualifications market – these 
findings are not necessarily representative of apprenticeships 
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engagement by AOs; we have heard from a range of stakeholders that AOs’ employer 
panels tend to consist of the major employers within the subject area. This could lead to 
smaller employers having to use qualifications and standards which were developed for 
larger employers and are less able to meet their needs. 
Our quantitative analysis supports the view that smaller employers are less likely to be 
involved in the process of designing qualifications. As shown in Table 4 below, one in 
seven employers with over 100 employees (14%) have helped design or set coursework 
for students, compared to around one in thirty (3-4%) employers with fewer than 25 
employees. This difference is likely to matter if small and large employers have different 
skills needs.  
Table 7 Employer engagement in VQ design 
Establishment size 
(employees) 
Share of employers who helped design or set coursework 
for students 
2 to 4 3% 
5 to 9 3% 
10 to 24 4% 
25 to 99 7% 
100+ 14% 
Source: Employers Skills Survey  
Finding 6: Insufficient head-to-head competition could lead to lower levels of 
responsiveness and innovation.  
The existence of misaligned incentives in the market means that competition between 
AOs may not result in higher rigour, as training providers may demand less rigorous AOs, 
resulting in a race to the bottom. However, training providers are likely to demand 
innovative AOs that provide high levels of customer service. Further, all else equal 
training providers are likely to prefer responsive AOs – unlike rigour, this does not affect 
their success rates and funding. Theory would therefore suggest that competition could 
improve AOs’ incentives to respond and innovate, whereas in markets with no 
competition, training providers have no option but to use the monopoly AO. 
It is worth noting that the appropriate measure of competition is likely to differ across 
different parts of the vocational qualifications market. Some markets consist of very few 
qualifications, in which case training providers can easily substitute one AO for another. 
For example, there is only one main qualification in Level 4+ Accounting and Finance, 
which accounts for 99% of all learners in this segment. However, in some parts of the 
market, qualifications within a subject area are very varied and specialised. For example, 
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qualifications in Building and Construction cover a wide range of skills, from bench 
joinery to painting and decorating to bricklaying to plumbing. 
In markets where there are a large number of specialised qualifications within a subject 
area, market shares at a subject-level would not be likely to capture the true level of 
competition in the market, as the qualifications offered by different AOs would not be 
interchangeable. However, it is also possible that head-to-head competition is too narrow 
a measure of competition and understates the true level of competition in subject areas 
with many equivalent qualifications with different titles. 
In our analysis of the relationship between competition and responsiveness and 
innovation, we therefore considered two measures of concentration:41 
1. Subject-level competition: overall share of the AO within subject area 
2. Head-to-head competition: share of the AO within qualification title measuring 
the extent to which AOs compete at the level of individual qualifications) 
Our regression analysis42 finds that competition is associated with better outcomes in 
terms of responsiveness and innovation using the head-to-head measure of competition. 
However, we do not appear to find the same result if we measure concentration at the 
subject area level. This suggests that competition between AOs does indeed increase 
incentives to provide better quality service, but only when AOs compete directly over 
individual qualifications. 
Our qualitative evidence supports our general finding that there is some relationship 
between the extent of competition faced by AOs and their level of responsiveness and 
innovation. In particular, some training providers gave examples of AOs with high market 
shares that are not innovative, for example using outdated online systems and providing 
poor customer service. However, the training providers did not feel that they could switch 
away from these AOs, as they were the only ones providing a particular qualification. 
Some training providers felt that certain large AOs were unresponsive to changing 
industry demands, for example failing to adapt the content of their qualifications to reflect 
technological changes. 
Wider policy-relevant findings 
Given a core purpose of vocational education is to contribute to a skilled and productive 
workforce, in a well-functioning market we would expect to see individuals either leave 
                                            
 
41 We measure concentration using the HHI index, which is the standard measure in competition 
economics. A higher HHI index corresponds to a higher level of concentration (fewer AOs competing). 
42 For further details, please refer to the Annex (technical analysis on drivers of market outcomes). 
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learning at the point at which they have the requisite skills and become employed, or go 
on and acquire skills to a higher level. However, there is a concern that some learners 
repeat learning at levels already attained. The prevalence of this is useful to explore. 
We consider learners observed in 2010-11 at different levels and look at the learning 
subsequently undertaken up to 2014-15. Table 8 shows the progression of Level 1 
learners. Of these learners, 42% did not undertake any further learning (top left cell). 
43% went on to do another Level 1 qualification in the following years (sum of bottom 
row): 32% did not progress beyond Level 1, and 11% progressed to Level 2 or higher 
(bottom right cell). Only 15% went on to learn at Level 2 or higher without any further 
learning at Level 1 (top right cell). 
This is to say that a greater proportion of Level 1 learners repeat Level 1 learning without 
progressing, than those who progress. This may be due to a lack of incentives (funding 
or otherwise) in the system for learners to progress, which may be compounded by the 
importance of success rates to training providers. 
Table 8 Progression of Level 1 learners first observed in 2010-11 over subsequent 5 years  
 Maximum level reached 
Years spent at Level 1 Level 1 Level 2+ 
1 42% 15% 
2+ 32% 11% 
Source: Frontier analysis of ILR data 
Our analysis also found that Level 2 learning has a low progression rate (7%) relative to 
‘repeat’ rate (23%), as shown below. This may be explained in part by longer course 
duration and more sector-specific skills, so that changing path requires more learning at 
levels already attained. The ‘repeat’ rate may also reflect a learner in a particular 
vocation adding further Level 2 units in that area, complementing the current stock of 
qualifications (for example, a plumber gaining an additional plumbing certificate in a 
specific area). Indeed, in many vocations a Level 2 qualification is sufficient and there is 
no need to progress further. As such the lack of progression at Level 2 is perhaps less 
cause for concern than the substantial proportion of learners taking multiple qualifications 
at Level 1. 
Table 9 Progression of Level 2 learners first observed in 2010-11 over subsequent 5 years  
 Maximum level reached 
Years spent at Level 2 Level 2 Level 3+ 
1 67% 7% 
2+ 23% 3% 
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Source: Frontier analysis of ILR data 
Having identified a number of potential weaknesses in the market, the next chapter 
explores some potential reforms to the market to address these weaknesses, with 
particular focus on reforms to the structure of the market.  
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8. Options for reforming the vocational qualifications 
market 
In general, in any market, competition is a desirable feature as it can enable the delivery 
of efficient outcomes. In the context of the vocational qualifications market, an effective 
market should be delivering qualifications that demonstrate the RRRI features described 
earlier. Our work shows that the extent to which the qualifications market demonstrates 
these features varies considerably across different market segments. This raises 
questions about the ability of the market, as it is currently set up, to deliver efficient 
outcomes.    
Previous studies have found structural issues in the vocational qualifications market and 
questioned whether the model currently in operation, which is intended to be competitive, 
is delivering the best possible outcomes for all market participants. The Wolf Review43, 
for example, found that incentives in the system (e.g. a reliance on performance tables) 
were misaligned such that training providers were rewarded for offering qualifications 
with little currency in the labour market which led to large numbers of young people 
enrolling on courses which did not help them succeed in the world of work.  
Although the Wolf report was successful in identifying the need for reform and there has 
been a large reduction in the range of qualifications which can be included in 
performance tables since its publication, recent evidence suggests that structural 
weaknesses in this market persist. The Independent Panel on Technical Education 
chaired by Lord Sainsbury (The Sainsbury Panel), which reported to government in the 
Summer of 2016, found that there is little incentive for AOs to design demanding 
qualifications which meet the requirements of industry because employers find it difficult 
to navigate the system and to remain up to date on the value of competing qualifications. 
This, coupled with the lack of accountability to ensure qualifications meet employers’ 
needs can lead to competition enabling a race to the bottom rather than improving 
outcomes.  
Our own work summarised in Chapter 7 identified a number of potential weaknesses in 
the vocational qualifications market that could hinder the ability of the market to function 
effectively and deliver qualifications that have RRRI characteristics. It is important to note 
that a number of weaknesses identified in the market appear to be associated with its 
current market structure.  
                                            
 
43 Wolf, A. (2011), Review of Vocational Education – The Wolf Report (available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/180504/DFE-00031-
2011.pdf)  
94 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, competition in the market appears to have led to a 
large number of qualifications and AOs; that is, the very force that improves 
responsiveness and innovation inevitably reduces recognisability. This highlights the 
inherent tensions between the RRRI features and that they actually cannot 
simultaneously exist in every part of the market, and nor would this be desirable. 
Further, whilst a race to the bottom may be driven by the particular regulatory regime in 
place, it is difficult to conceive of any regulatory system that would not produce some 
negative outcomes (adverse effects). If, for example, training providers were rewarded on 
the basis of employment destinations rather than success rates, they would have an 
incentive to ‘cherry-pick’ the most able learners and offer specialised routes at the 
expense of qualifications that develop general transferable skills, which would help their 
longer term careers. The complex nature of the vocational qualifications market, 
characterised by a long customer chain whose objectives are not always aligned and in 
which quality is difficult to define and verify, means that it is inherently difficult to deliver 
qualifications that demonstrate RRRI characteristics within a competitive market 
structure.  
Against this backdrop, the Sainsbury Panel has put forward a case for wholesale reforms 
of the 16-19 market which aims to simplify and streamline the system and create clear 
routes of progression leading into employment in specific occupations. At the heart of the 
proposed reforms is the creation of standards, developed by employers to ensure that 
the skills of learners meet the needs of employers. Rather than continuing with the 
existing market-based qualifications system which appears to be unique internationally44 
(in most other countries we have examined the state has a larger role in the design of 
qualifications), the Sainsbury Panel has recommended a move towards a licensing model 
where for each occupation (or cluster of occupations) a single AO (or a consortium of 
AOs) are licenced to offer the relevant new tech levels. The move towards a more 
centralised system proposed by the Sainsbury Panel is consistent with models used in 
many other countries.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a series of policy scenarios which could be 
used to address the market weaknesses discussed previously. We consider the potential 
benefits of reforms at the high level and then examine in some detail their associated 
downsides and any mitigating actions that could be taken to prevent these from 
materialising. This highlights to policy makers the potential risks that could be introduced 
in the system following changes as well as what choices and trade-offs may be available 
to them under different circumstances.  
                                            
 
44 We are not aware of any other countries where qualifications are developed and delivered in a 
competitive market as they are in the UK (See Chapter 3 for some international evidence) 
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It is important to note that there are different risks associated with different approaches 
and there are no risk free options. The preferred approach policy makers ultimately take 
will depend on their priorities. This analysis can help decision makers identify which 
policy options best meet their objectives and preferences but does not, in its own right, 
show if one option is better than another. 
Importantly also, the diversity of the vocational qualifications market must be borne in 
mind. Therefore, policy makers should be open to implementing reforms in some parts of 
the market but not others, and indeed different policy reforms may be justified in different 
market segments.  
Given that the majority of the potential market weaknesses identified in Chapter 7 relate 
to market structure (i.e. who operates in the market, the incentives they face and hence 
their market behaviour), and the strength of other existing evidence confirming this 
finding, the focus of this chapter is on structural policy reform options. That is, we focus 
on options that change the nature and scale of competition in the market, whether that is 
to introduce competition for the market, or to change the nature of competition in the 
market. This is clearly of particular relevance to policy makers following the 
recommendations in the Sainsbury Panel which proposed structural reforms in the 16-19 
vocational qualifications market (briefly outlined above).  
Structural reforms aimed at addressing the market weaknesses discussed previously, 
can lead to improved outcomes in relation to the ability of qualifications to demonstrate 
RRRI characteristics. For example, streamlining the system into a relatively small number 
of routes (as recommended by the Sainsbury Panel) leading into specific occupations 
with a single qualification attached to each new tech level is likely to improve recognition 
compared to the current system in which there are thousands of competing qualifications. 
Similarly, the introduction of a common framework of technical education standards 
designed by panels of professionals could improve the consistency of qualifications and 
thus aid rigour. Obviously, the most appropriate policy reform option will depend on what 
policy makers are trying to achieve i.e. whether they place greater weight on 
recognisability and rigour or on responsiveness and innovation.   
In this Chapter we first describe our headline findings before presenting: 
• An overview of our assessment approach 
• Key decision dimensions that policy-makers need to consider when exploring 
potential reforms 
• Overarching risks and benefits 
• Potential reform scenarios 
• Implementation issues to consider 
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Headline findings 
We have considered six policy scenarios in total. Some cover competition for the market 
where a single licence is awarded to an AO (or consortium) to offer qualifications in a 
segment of the market, while others consider competition in the market where multiple 
AOs can compete in a market segment. Drawing on first principles, we have been able to 
identify the potential benefits and risks associated with each scenario. We have also 
considered how the benefits and risks may vary under different forms of contract, for 
example, different contract periods and different parts of the product chain being 
tendered (e.g. whether the content of the qualifications is for the successful contractor to 
determine, or developed centrally).  
As previously noted, moving to a more centralised system in which government has 
control over the content of vocational qualifications and stipulates how they are assessed 
has the potential to bring significant benefits to the market. For example, centralising 
content and assessment, while allowing competition either in or for the market in 
delivering qualifications that meet those government specifications can improve 
recognition and rigour and remove the incentives for a race to the bottom.  
Having a small number of clearly defined routes and a single AO (or single AO 
consortium) delivering all of those routes could aid recognition among learners and 
employers. What is more, setting content for a period of time provides stability in the 
market. The improved rigour and recognition should ultimately translate into improved 
labour market outcomes for learners undertaking technical vocational education. 
A centralised system can also have downsides too that would need to be mitigated. As 
our work has found, competition can be an effective tool in driving improvements in 
customer support so a reduction in competition in that part of the product chain could 
potentially have negative effects on customer service, which training providers say they 
value. Policy reforms that introduce competition for the market (i.e. AOs compete for the 
single licence to operate in a part of the market) need to be designed to mimic the 
competitive incentives for maintaining customer service in a market.   
Structural reforms, as well as introducing benefits, also entail a number of risks for which 
action is needed to mitigate. These include for example, a risk of system failure where 
limiting market access to a single AO can lead to a situation where there are no 
alternative AO to step in in the event of failure. Another issue associated with limiting 
market access is the potential removal of future competition - AOs that do not 
successfully win a contract may not be able to viably continue offering services in the 
market until the contract is next awarded, leaving few or no credible alternative to existing 
licensees in future. A set of wider risks associated with structural reforms are discussed 
in more detail in subsequent sections.  
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Many of the above risks can be mitigated through appropriate mechanisms, and it is 
essential to think through these possible mitigating solutions carefully when considering 
any reform choices.  
In addition to the risks and benefits discussed above, we identified a number of cross-
cutting implementation issues which the government should consider.  
• Timing of reforms. When structural reforms are proposed for any market, it is 
important to allow adequate time for implementation so that market participants 
(e.g. AOs) can respond to changes effectively. 
• Potential for planning blight. Uncertainty as to what changes will take place and 
when could create planning blight, i.e. reduce the incentive for AOs to invest in 
developing qualifications while they wait for policy to be fully specified. Naturally 
there is a flipside to this in that that government may not desire AOs to develop 
qualifications which do not meet its new requirements.  
• Involvement of AOs. It will be important to continue to engage with AOs to 
ensure that any reforms are practical and deliverable.  
• Interaction with vocational education policy other parts of the UK. Policy 
changes implemented by DfE for England could have a knock-on effect on other 
countries of the UK. AOs supply qualifications in England as well as other parts of 
the UK (as well as internationally), but for most, England is the biggest market.  
• Interaction with other parts of the education system. Policy changes in the 
vocational qualifications could impact on academic qualifications, particularly if the 
same market participants operate in both. 
Overview of our assessment approach 
Given many of the weaknesses which hinder some parts of the vocational qualifications 
market from demonstrating RRRI characteristics relate to market structure, our 
assessment of the potential policy reform options to overcome the market weaknesses 
focus on structural reforms i.e. those that affect the way in which participants in the 
market interact and compete with each other. Examples of structural reforms would 
include moving from a competitive market to exclusive tenders; or moving from the 
market participants delivering all parts of the product chain (i.e. developing qualifications 
content, providing delivery support and competence assessment) to some of the parts 
being determined centrally (e.g. the content would be set by government as part of a 
national curriculum).  
There are clearly many different approaches that policy makers can take to address the 
weaknesses that characterise this market and we are unable to analyse all of these. We 
have selected a small number of policy scenarios to illustrate the benefits, risks and 
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trade-offs that policy makers could face. The scenarios are broadly reflective of the types 
of reforms proposed by the Sainsbury Panel so consider the establishment of technical 
routes and potentially sub-routes (or new tech levels within a route) and the different 
dynamics that might emerge following their establishment. For the purposes of our 
analysis we have assumed that licences are awarded on the basis of competitive 
tenders. The scenarios are a useful thought experiment which helps bring to life some of 
the issues that policy makers ought to consider. What choices are ultimately made will 
depend on the priorities and preferences of decision makers.  
Choices policy makers make will in some cases need to be a finely based judgement 
having weighed up the trade-offs of risks and benefits. The choices described in this 
chapter are not intended to be exhaustive as there will be other points of detail that policy 
makers will need to address. These might include, for example, who owns the intellectual 
property rights if licences are tendered. 
We used a 4-step approach in making our assessment of potential policy reform options: 
1. We began by defining the key dimensions along which policy decisions could be 
made. This included, for example, determining the duration over which licences for 
the delivery of services could be awarded. 
2. We then outlined the overarching benefits and risks associated with these high-
level policy decisions. More specifically, we looked at the potential benefits and 
risks to the ability of the market to deliver qualifications that are rigorous, 
recognisable, responsive and innovative, as well as identifying other systemic and 
procurement risks. 
3. To explore the potential implications of different reform options, we assessed six 
scenarios for reform in detail, each reflecting different combinations of policy 
choices along the dimensions identified in step 1. This included consideration of 
the associated risks and benefits, along with options for mitigating any resultant 
risks.  
4. Lastly, we identified a number of implementation issues, which should be 
considered if structural reforms are to be pursued.  
The elements of the four step approach are described in detail below. 
Key decision dimensions 
We identified the following five key dimensions along which structural reforms (which 
introduce some form of tendering to award licences) require decisions: 
• Market specification. This dimension has some similarities with the market 
definition stage of the market assessment. It consists of: 
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o Firstly, specifying the scope of the market considered for reform (e.g. 16-19 
year olds, adult learners, apprenticeships); and 
o Secondly, deciding how this market should be delineated into sub-markets 
in which organisations can deliver services (e.g. by subject area, or by 
individual qualification).  
For example, decisions will need to be made around whether reforms cover just the 
16-19 vocational qualifications market or adults too; and whether vocational 
qualifications in those sub-markets should be separated into thematic routes (e.g. 
retail and commercial, health care), and if so, the number of routes. A further decision 
might also be needed around whether these routes should be separated further into 
sub-routes or even individual qualifications which AOs would be licenced to provide. 
This aspect can be considered the ‘contract breadth’. 
• Product chain. This dimension specifies the elements of the product chain which 
organisations will be licenced to deliver. The key elements are the development of 
the content of the qualifications, the provision of delivery support to training 
providers; and assessment of learners’ competence. A decision needs to be made 
about whether AOs would be licenced to deliver all of the elements, or only some 
of them. If contracts are awarded, a decision also needs to be made on how 
elements of the product chain are packaged into contracts. This can be 
considered the ‘contract depth’. 
• Exclusivity of market access. This dimension specifies the extent to which 
organisations will face competition both to access the market and once in the 
market. For example, where a vocational qualifications route is licenced, this 
would relate to how many AOs are awarded a licence to operate in that sub-
market (they could be a monopolist or face competition from other licenced AOs).   
• Length of contract. This dimension specifies the length of the period for which 
access to the market is granted, for example three or five years.  
• Wider regulatory and policy environment. This dimension concerns decisions 
around the nature of policy and regulatory frameworks to facilitate the desired 
market outcomes.  
Decisions also need to be made on other cross-cutting issues around the following two 
dimensions: 
• Licence evaluation criteria. If the market moves towards tendering contracts, the 
criteria for assessing tenders need to be specified. In particular, decisions need to 
be made about the weight placed on price and quality, as well as how quality is 
defined for the different elements of the product chain. Another aspect to consider 
is how to handle a situation in which, under exclusive licences per sub-route, a 
single AO wins all or most of the contracts.  
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• Eligibility to bid. A decision is needed about who is eligible to bid. The key 
considerations here may be around whether an AO would need to be Ofqual-
regulated or not as well as whether they have sufficient operational capacity. 
Depending on how the markets are defined and how many contracts per sub-route 
are awarded, the scale of the contracts might be very substantial. Qualitative 
evidence suggests that scaling up operations significantly for small AOs is not 
straightforward, and at times might be impossible within a fixed period of time. 
Therefore it needs to be decided if minimum operational capacity requirements are 
to be imposed on the bidders, and the extent to which consortia would be 
considered and assessed.   
Overarching risks and benefits 
Having identified the key dimensions for decision-making, we describe below our 
assessment of the underlying risks and benefits associated with the key decision 
dimensions. Before describing those risks, we first highlight the potential trade-offs that 
should be considered, and the potential implications for the extent to which vocational 
qualifications demonstrate RRRI characteristics.  
Structural reforms of the nature considered in this chapter rely on a procurement exercise 
being able to mimic the competitive constraints that would otherwise be expected in a 
competitive market. The purpose of such reforms is to overcome the challenges in some 
parts of the current market that have been identified. The intended benefits of introducing 
structural reforms would be to improve rigour, recognisability, responsiveness and 
innovation because these would either be actively specified in contracts or facilitated 
through the reformed nature of competition.  
It is important to note that although we have set out policy reforms referring to the market 
as a whole (or large parts of the market), in practice, it is likely that the appropriate 
reforms could vary across the different segments of the market, depending on which of 
the RRRI characteristics are seen as most desirable, and the particular weaknesses that 
are currently observed across market segments. Policy makers will need to bear this 
need for flexibility in mind. Nonetheless, the risks and benefits associated with different 
reform options we identify are relevant, whatever the scale of their implementation.  
For potential reforms to be effective, there are some trade-offs and wider risks that would 
need to be managed, as described below. It is worth noting that there are a number of 
mitigating factors that will influence the extent to which the risks set out below are likely 
to materialise. We do not consider these below but discuss them in some detail within the 
policy scenarios.  
Trade-offs in the decision dimensions 
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There are trade-offs involved along each of the key decision dimensions. We illustrate 
some of these below. 
• Market specification involves the choice over the scope of the market considered 
and the number of routes or sub-routes that could be tendered. Streamlining the 
number of routes and sub-routes would facilitate recognisability for learners or 
employers and transparency of the system. However, tendering more sub-routes 
may promote flexibility, responsiveness and choice for learners and training 
providers.  
• Product chain decisions involve the choice over which part of the product is 
tendered. On one hand, separating content and developing it centrally facilitates 
common standards and may therefore improve rigour or recognisability. On the 
other hand, a centrally determined curriculum may pose risks to responsiveness, 
in particular when there is no mechanism for the market to choose ‘best’ content45 
although clearly there are actions government can take to mitigate against this 
risk46.   
• Exclusivity of market access requires choosing how many AOs can serve the 
market (i.e. a route). While a single AO facilitates recognisability, lack of 
competition may reduce incentives to improve and innovate. Also, while a single 
AO per route implies the administrative costs for the government would be lower 
(compared with a scenario in which there are multiple AOs offering services in a 
route), there could be a longer term risk of system failure (i.e. if the AO fails to 
deliver and there are no alternative mechanisms in place to provide cover). 
• Duration of contract decisions could introduce more stability in the market and 
increase incentives to invest if a longer contract period is chosen. However, longer 
contracts may reduce the resilience of the market because the longer potential 
competitors have to wait to rebid for a contract, the less likely they are to survive in 
the market absent a contract. Therefore, in an extreme case in which contracts 
last say 10 years, many of the losing bidders (and also potential bidders for the 
next contracts) may in the meantime go out of business. Another risk of longer 
                                            
 
45 Under the current system, training providers have the option of switching away from AOs if they are 
unhappy with the content (or any other part of the product chain). While this might take some time, 
competitive dynamics would be expected to eventually ‘filter out’ demand for qualifications with poor 
content, while demand for qualifications with relevant content is likely to increase. The ability of the current 
system to withdraw poor content qualifications may be dependent on a number factors (e.g. a period of 
stability may be needed for this process to take effect and/or training providers would need to be 
incentivised to withdraw poor content qualifications). It is also worth noting that during the period of 
transition (where poor qualifications are filtered out) young learners who have only one opportunity to do a 
fully funded programme would be disadvantaged.   
46 This involves for example engaging employers in the design of standards as recommended by the 
Sainsbury Panel. 
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contracts is the possibility of being locked into a suboptimal arrangement. For 
example, if the delivery of a contract is below expected standards, or technical 
developments reduce costs relative to contract price.  
• Wider regulatory and policy environment involves deciding on the structure and 
form of regulation. While increased regulation is likely to have some benefits - for 
example regulation of content ensures rigour - it also increases the regulatory 
burden on the sector.  
Trade-offs in the ability of vocational qualifications to demonstrate all four RRRI 
characteristics 
Structural policy reforms would aim to improve the functioning of the market to deliver 
rigorous, recognisable, responsive and innovative (RRRI) vocational qualifications. 
However, as illustrated above, there are trade-offs involved in choosing the reform 
options, and there is no solution which will bring only benefits and no risks. In 
particular, however, we note that structural reforms may improve performance with 
respect to some of the RRRI characteristics, but may also introduce some risks: 
• Rigour. Centralising content development could improve rigour and 
recognisability, but there is a risk around ensuring the content aligns with market 
needs and practical deliverability. This risk can be mitigated against by securing 
adequate stakeholder (employers, practitioners, professionals, education experts) 
engagement in the development of content.  
• Recognisability. Simplifying the system into routes would make each route in 
itself recognisable, shifting the focus of the recognisability off the AOs (where at 
the moment, the reputation of the AO is often the focus of recognisability for the 
employer). 
• Responsiveness. Centralising content could hinder responsiveness if the 
curriculum is not regularly updated to reflect changing employer needs. On the 
other hand, if employers are adequately engaged in the development of content, 
the risk to responsiveness is likely to be substantially reduced47.  
• Innovation. Allowing head to head competition by licensing to multiple AOs on a 
particular route may increase incentives to innovate while reducing competition 
may reduce incentives to innovate. 
Set of wider risks 
                                            
 
47 It is also worth noting that too much change is also not desirable as it places a large burden on training 
providers to continually adapt their provision so periodic (e.g. 3 years) content reviews are likely to be 
adequate.  
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In addition to the risks and benefits around RRRI, we have identified a number of 
other risks which are, to varying degrees, applicable to most policy options. Various 
mitigation strategies will be available to decision makers to reduce the magnitude of 
or eliminate these risks. It should be noted that some of these risks will vary in their 
magnitude and intensity over time: 
• System failure risk. There is a risk of the market failing if only one or a small 
number of AOs are in operation with no alternative AOs (when the AOs are ‘too 
big to fail’). Examples of situations when the system could fail include when the 
AO(s) become financially unviable; they fail to deliver on key aspects of a 
qualification (either because of poor management or unforeseen events, like IT 
failure); or when they do not meet their contract requirements. A possible 
mitigation against this risk is to put in place a contingency for supplier of last resort 
(which could be an alternative AO or even government)  
• Procurement risks. Examples include the risk of mis-specifying the requirements 
for the tender, or inability to judge tender submissions adequately so that the 
genuinely best bids are chosen (rather than the ones that look best on paper). In 
particular, it might be difficult to specify quality in tenders and assess the quality 
aspect of bids, which may lead to concentrating too much on price. This risk can 
be mitigated by planning the procurement appropriately.   
• Risk of disruption and increased administration cost for training providers. 
Any changes to the current system are likely to entail changes in contracts which 
impose administrative costs on training providers. In addition, some options for 
reform could force training providers to contract with multiple AOs, despite some 
training providers (especially the smaller ones) currently preferring to contract with 
a small number of AOs to minimise the administrative burden. A possible 
mitigation against this risk may involve implementing common set of requirements 
that all successful AOs must adhere to in order to reduce differences between 
them. 
• Inefficiency risk. There is a risk of incentives being misaligned, which facilitates 
inefficiency of the AOs. For example, if AOs do not face actual or prospective 
competition, or if there is a lack of adequate regulation, they may have little 
incentive to keep their costs, and hence prices, down. This risk will to some extent 
be limited by the amount of public funding available per student but an alternative 
mitigation strategy may be to introduce price regulation (e.g. price caps) applicable 
to what AOs are allowed to charge.  
• Quality of service risk. This refers to the risk that training providers may receive 
poor service from AOs unless adequately incentivised by the contract. If there is 
no competitive or regulatory pressure on AOs they may reduce their spending and 
efforts on the support they give to training providers. In the case of tendering 
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contracts, this risk is enhanced by the separation between who makes the 
decision (the government) and who receives the service (the training providers). 
To mitigate against this risk, the contract would need to specify quality of service 
levels and potentially introduce rewards and penalties for breaching these.  
• Insufficient breadth risk. There is a risk that too much simplification to the 
system may deprive it of the necessary breadth and flexibility to reflect the 
complexity of the vocational qualification needs. This would hinder the ability of the 
system to meet employer and learner needs. For example, if too few routes are 
created, some specialisms may be lost, or if content is centrally decided and is 
over specified, local variation in employer needs might not be met.   
• Risk of removing future competition. This refers to the longer term risk to levels 
of competition in the market. More specifically, current and potential competition 
may leave/ not enter the market, or consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions may lead to the same players winning all contracts (e.g. if an AO does 
not win any contracts it may not be viable when the contract is re-tendered). 
Consolidation is not necessarily a bad outcome if it leads to the highest quality and 
most efficient suppliers serving the market.  
• Risk of impractical content. If relevant stakeholders are not sufficiently involved 
in the development of content there is a risk that it may be incorrectly specified 
and/ or impractical to teach or assess. To mitigate against this risk, it is essential 
that key stakeholders (employers, practitioners, education specialists, assessors 
and others) are involved in the development of content. 
• Risk of insufficient capacity. This refers to the fact that the capacity of bidders to 
serve the whole market maybe insufficient. This could be mitigated by requiring 
bidders to have minimum capacity levels, including flexibility to form consortia to 
ensure the required capacity. 
In the following section, where we explore selected reform options in more detail, we 
suggest a number of mitigation actions that could be considered.  
Potential policy reform scenarios 
Earlier on we identified a number of key decision dimensions that any structural reforms 
would need to consider. Combining decisions against each dimension suggests a wide 
number of policy reform scenarios are possible (as illustrated in Figure 24).  
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Figure 24 Illustration of the breadth of possible policy scenarios 
 
 
It is not feasible for us to cover the full breadth of possible reform options in our analysis 
so in order to illustrate the risks and benefits associated with different reform options, we 
have carried out an assessment of six illustrative reform scenarios. These are designed 
to reflect the wide range of possible reforms that government may wish to implement 
going forward.  
The scenarios we have examined are broadly reflective of the reforms proposed by the 
Sainsbury Panel for 16-19s in that they assume the establishment of technical routes and 
then consider different options for changing the way in which competition operates within 
the market, moving from free competition between AOs to a more managed system of 
licences. For the purposes of our analysis we assume that licences are awarded on the 
basis of a tendering exercise. 
The policy scenarios we have analysed are summarised in Figure 25.  
In the first three scenarios we examine the effects of possible reforms to the 16-19 
market, assuming no changes are made to the current adult market. The differences 
between the first three scenarios are around: 
• the size of the market segment that a licence is awarded to supply - ranging from 
the whole of the 16-19 market in scenario 1 to a single sub-route (or tech level) in 
scenarios 2 and 3; 
Decision 1: which markets to 
tender
16-19 market all routes together
16-19 market 15 separate routes
16-19 market 15 separate routes with 
4/5 tech levels each
16-19 market 15 separate routes with 
multiple (e.g. 20) tech levels each
Decision 2: what product is 
tendered
Content, delivery, assessment
Decision 3: exclusivity of 
market access
Single exclusive license
Decision 4: duration of 
contract
3 years
5 years
Multiple licenses
3 years
5 years
Delivery, assessment
Single exclusive license
3 years
5 years
Multiple licenses
3 years
5 years
Delivery
Single exclusive license
3 years
5 years
Multiple licenses
3 years
5 years… …
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• whether a single supplier is licenced to offer services in the relevant market 
segment (as in scenarios 1 and 2) or multiple licences are awarded within each 
market segment as in scenario 3; 
• whether the duration of licences is 5 years (as in scenarios 1 and 3) or 3 years as 
in scenario 2; 
Scenarios 4, 5 and 6 relate to reforms of the adult vocational qualifications market, 
assuming the 16-19 market undergoes reforms such as that in scenarios 2. The 
differences between the second three scenarios are around: 
• the size of the adult market segment that a licence is awarded to supply. The adult 
market is divided into routes and further into sub-routes where the number of sub-
routes ranges from 4 or 5 in scenario 4 to a considerably larger number (e.g. 20) 
in scenarios 5 and 6. In each of the scenarios licences are awarded for each 
individual sub-route; 
• the element of the product chain that AOs are licenced to offer services in ranging 
from the full product chain (as in the current system) in scenario 6 to customer 
support and assessment in scenarios 4 and 5. 
• whether a single supplier is licenced to offer services in the relevant market 
segment (as in scenarios 5 and 6) or multiple licences are awarded within each 
market segment as in scenario 4; 
• whether the duration of licences is 5 years (as in scenario 4) or 3 years as in 
scenarios 5 and 6; 
107 
 
Figure 25 Policy scenarios considered 
 
 
Below we discuss the key risks and benefits of each scenario, focusing on differences 
between them. Scenario 1 is described in most detail, and the following scenarios focus 
only on the differences relative to the previous scenario(s). As such, all the risks and 
benefits associated with previous scenarios still apply, unless stated otherwise.  
The assessment of risks will be dependent on decisions taken across all parts of the 
market. For example, the risk of the reforms to the market for 16-19 year-olds will depend 
on the arrangements in place for adult vocational qualifications.  
Scenario 1: All 16-19 routes tendered together under exclusive 5 year licence, content is 
developed centrally 
 
Under this scenario, the whole of the 16-19 market is tendered as a whole for a period of 
five years and a single licence is awarded.  
This scenario entails a number of benefits, such as: 
• Economies of scale for the successful AO which could reduce the cost of the 
associated services; 
Decision 1: which markets 
to tender
16-19 market all routes together, 
adult market as now 
Decision 2: what product is 
tendered
Decision 3: exclusivity of 
market access
Single exclusive license
Decision 4: duration of 
contract
5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
16-19 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, adult market as now 
Single exclusive license 3 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 3
16-19 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, adult market as now 
Multiple licenses 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 4
Adult 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, market for 16 - 19 as in 
Scenario 2 or 3
Multiple licenses 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 5
Adult 15 routes (and multiple, e.g. 
20, sub routes within each route) 
tendered separately, market for 16 -
19 as in Scenario 2 or 3
Single exclusive license 3 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 6
Adult 15 routes (and multiple, e.g. 
20, sub routes within each route) 
tendered separately, market for 16 -
19 as in Scenario 2 or 3
Single exclusive license 3 years
Content, delivery, assessment
[content designed by AOs]
16-19 market all routes together, 
adult market as now Single exclusive license 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
Scenario 1
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• Potentially lower contracting costs for training providers given they only need to 
contract with one AO for all 16-19 provision;  
• Transparency around who is operating in the market; and 
• Less disruption for training providers (once new contracts are already in place) 
because they only have one set of AO requirements to comply with in the way 
they deliver the qualifications.  
However, there are also some risks.  
• First, there is a high risk of ‘shorting’ the market. A single licence, together with a 
long contract period, could eliminate potential future competition, especially if the 
winning bid acquires all relevant specialists in order to secure the contract with 
sufficient breadth of expertise. This is because it would mean that whoever wins 
the first tender could be the only bidder available in 5 years’ time to re-bid. 
However, the fact that this scenario leads to a monopoly in the 16-19 vocational 
qualifications market, and is accompanied by the current market structure in the 
adult market means this risk is mitigated to some extent because potential 
competitors could remain in that side of the market. However, if a similar system 
were to be created in the adult market, the risk of ‘shorting’ the market could be 
substantial.  
• Furthermore, there is a risk of system failure. If a single AO is responsible for 
delivery and assessment of qualifications of all 16-19 vocational qualifications, if it 
fails, it is not clear who would step in to ensure continuity of service for learners. 
This risk could however be mitigated to some extent if AOs from the adult 
vocational qualifications were able to step in as supplier or last resort or indeed 
government was able to fulfil this role on a temporary basis.  
• There is also a risk relating to the quality of service in the market because there is 
no competitive pressure facing the monopolist AO. This could be particularly 
problematic if contracts are not able to adequately specify all relevant aspects of 
quality. This risk could be mitigated through an adequate regulatory framework 
providing the incentive for the monopolist to deliver a high quality of service 
through a system of rewards and penalties for over/under performance.  
• There is also a risk around the capacity of any one AO to meet the requirements 
of the whole 16-19 market nation-wide. It is likely that consortia would need to be 
formed. This in itself could pose risks because AOs would effectively be forced to 
work together with their competitors which could create problems associated with 
governance across the partners to the consortium, intellectual property ownership, 
accountability for performance, financial viability of all partners over the period of 
the contract, management of exit by any of the partners during the contract period 
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etc. Given the potential complexity of this relationship, there may be a role for 
government to facilitate those agreements.  
In relation to the extent to which this scenario would be likely to deliver rigour, 
recognisability, responsiveness and innovation, a centrally designed content could 
ensure rigour and consistency of standards. However, there is a potential risk that 
content becomes over-specified and impractical to assess or teach (particularly if AOs 
have little or no involvement in its design). Furthermore, there is no market mechanism in 
place to allow training providers to choose the content that best meets the needs of their 
local employers. The risks relating to rigour could be mitigated by ensuring that content 
development panels comprise stakeholders who are able to both ensure the content is 
relevant and meets employers’ needs, while also being practical and deliverable. For 
example, AOs could be involved in this process as is currently the case with A-levels.  
Recognisability is likely to be enhanced by this scenario, as a small number of clearly 
defined routes and a single AO delivering all of those routes aid recognition among 
learners and employers. What is more, setting content for a period of 5 years provides 
stability in the market.  
Responsiveness of qualifications could be affected in a number of ways: 
• Responsiveness could be impaired if the content of the vocational qualifications is 
not updated for a long period because there would be little scope for content to 
respond to changing market conditions. It is also likely that a centrally 
administered process for updating content may be slower at responding to market 
needs than a commercially-driven one. This could be mitigated through processes 
to review content on an on-going basis, with flexibility to adapt it if required (e.g. 
every 3-5 years) recognising that in practice it would be difficult to implement 
changes which are too frequent as this places an undue burden on training 
providers to continually adapt their provision.  
• The separation between the decision-maker (the government) and the customer 
(the training provider) could create a risk that government selects an AO that 
would not be the preferred scenario of training providers (e.g. if some training 
providers prefer particular assessment methods over others) which raises 
concerns about the deliverability of qualifications. This is particularly likely to be a 
risk since training providers are very diverse and would therefore be likely to have 
different views about preferred AOs. This could be mitigated by building in a 
feedback loop between the training providers and the government (though this 
feedback could only take effect at the time of re-tendering) and ensuring adequate 
involvement of a broad base of training providers in the design of content.  
• In addition, responsiveness could be impaired if centrally designed content and 
centrally selected assessment methods are over-specified and are not able to 
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meet the needs of local employers or training providers. This risk could be 
mitigated by building in sufficient flexibility within the qualifications (for example, by 
offering flexible modules – though this in itself could have implications for 
recognisability and rigour).    
A longer contract period is good for innovation by strengthening incentives to invest in 
research and development as there is a longer period over which to reap any returns, 
and this could reinforce subsequent bids. On the other hand, incentives to invest and 
innovate could be constrained by the lack of competitive pressure facing the monopolist. 
From a dynamic perspective, a tendering could in itself constrain innovation because 
there is no incentive for the AO to go above and beyond what is specified in the contract. 
This could to some extent be mitigated by an appropriate regulatory framework, or 
contract specification, which incentivises innovation at the appropriate level.  
Scenario 2: All 16-19 routes (4 or 5 sub routes) tendered separately with exclusive 3 year 
licence, development of content is split out 
 
Under this scenario, the market is segmented into routes and sub-routes (new tech 
levels) and each sub-route is tendered separately, for a shorter period of time – three 
instead of five years. For the purposes of this scenario we have assumed that each route 
will be divided into 4 or 5 sub routes so in total around 70 licences would be awarded.   
The risks associated with lack of competition identified under scenario 1 are mitigated in 
this case because: 
• Bidding for sub-routes as opposed to the whole market may increase the potential 
for the process to be more competitive48. Competitively tendering sub-routes 
means that there is a greater chance of selecting the best AO for each defined 
sub-route, instead of choosing an AO which can deliver the overall set of routes 
but might not be the ‘best’ for specific sub-routes. Also, the pool of potential 
bidders is likely to be larger if routes are tendered separately, as only a limited 
number of AOs would be likely to have sufficient capacity to serve the whole 
country for all routes.  
• Competition at the sub-route level would also be likely to reduce the risk of 
‘shorting’ the market, as at the time of re-tendering AOs servicing other sub-routes 
could be potential competitors. In addition, the risk of not having any alternatives 
to step in should there be a system failure would be mitigated, since competitors 
                                            
 
48 It is of course possible that a single AO or consortium of AOs wins the tender for several sub-routes. 
Scenario 2
16-19 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, adult market as now 
Single exclusive license 3 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
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may potentially step in and service another sub-route. Indeed, this is even more of 
a possibility if content is centrally developed because the AOs would be 
developing arguably more generic services. 
• The shorter licence period means potential competitors are more likely to remain 
in business until the time of re-tendering. Moreover, opening up competition for the 
market more frequently is likely to incentivise AOs to deliver good quality of 
service and innovate; in order to help their subsequent bids at the time of re-
tendering i.e. reputation could be more important.  
A key additional risk relative to scenario 1 is the potential increase in administrative costs 
for training providers and the government due to the tendering process. While under 
scenario 1 training providers would need to contract with a single AO for all qualifications, 
under this scenario they would need to hold multiple contracts to cover different sub-
routes. What is more, the contracting period under this scenario is 3 years which 
suggests an increased burden on training providers to adapt to relatively frequent 
changes. The risk of administrative burden could be somewhat reduced if some sub-
routes were aggregated and offered together under a single licence where appropriate. 
Additionally, the fact that government would lead the re-tendering process means that 
they would not need to procure their own AOs, as is currently the case.   
Scenario 3: All 16-19 routes (4 or 5 sub routes) tendered separately with multiple 5 year 
licences, development of content is split out 
 
This scenario is a variant of Scenario 2 and we have assumed that each route will be 
divided into 4 or 5 sub routes so in total around 70 licences would be awarded. In this 
scenario, however, multiple licences are awarded to service each given sub-route i.e. 
AOs would still be competing with each other within each sub-route. So while Scenario 2 
created competition for the market at the stage of re-bidding, under this arrangement 
there is also competition in the market. Under this scenario the competitive threat should 
serve as a strong incentive for AOs to maintain good customer service to training 
providers. Furthermore, the availability of multiple AOs may serve as a stronger 
mitigation factor against system failure (relative to scenario 2) assuming that it is possible 
for AOs to scale up their operations significantly49. Overall, combining multiple licences 
with a longer period of contract introduces stability in the market (relative to scenario 2 
with shorter contracts), while also ensuring the benefits of competition are not lost. 
                                            
 
49 If this is not the case, this option is no better than option 2 at mitigating against the system failure risk. 
Scenario 3
16-19 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, adult market as now 
Multiple licenses 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
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Although contracting multiple AOs to service a sub-route would be likely to create more 
complexity in the market, this is not likely to significantly hinder recognition of 
qualifications. This is the case for two reasons: 
• AOs which provide qualifications would have had to be awarded a licence, which 
means they were subject to scrutiny and their qualifications merit recognition; and 
• The content would be centrally decided and therefore standardised across AOs.  
The scenario of multiple AOs operating in a given sub-route market is also likely to 
reduce administrative contracts for training providers relative to scenario 2. If multiple 
AOs are servicing each route, training providers are able to choose the AOs that best 
meet their needs (and potentially one they have worked with before) – and they would be 
able to select AOs that operate across sub-routes.  
A potential risk related to this scenario would arise if there was insufficient regulatory 
oversight because AOs may compete on the ‘wrong’ things (for example, they could 
compete on the ease of passing exams). This is an extension of the current weakness in 
the market related to the ‘race to the bottom’, which would still remain a risk if competition 
in the market remains but regulation is not strengthened. Additionally, competition in the 
market will involve AOs engaging in marketing activities and training providers requiring 
resource to select their preferred AO. Both may increase costs which are likely to be 
ultimately absorbed in funding rates over time. 
Scenario 4: Adult 15 routes (4 or 5 sub routes) tendered separately with multiple licences 
for 5 years; development of content is split out; 16-19 routes tendered separately 
 
This scenario repeats all the specifications of scenario 3, but is applied to the adult 
qualifications market, with the assumption that the 16-19 year-old market takes the form 
specified under scenario 250. 
There are two key issues specific to this scenario that should be considered. 
First of all, streamlining any market for qualifications into a fixed number of routes/ 
qualifications creates the risk of simplifying it too much for it to be fit for purpose. This is 
                                            
 
50 While the impact on the market for 16-19 year-olds is significantly different between options 2 and 3, for 
the purpose of our analysis of the adult qualifications space the distinction between the two options is less 
important. The key issue is that the qualifications for 16 - 19 year olds are streamlined into routes which are 
tendered separately. It is less important in the context of interaction with the adults market if there are 
exclusive or multiple licences to serve these routes.  
Scenario 4
Adult 15 routes (and 4 or 5 sub 
routes within each route) tendered 
separately, market for 16 - 19 as in 
Scenario 2 or 3
Multiple licenses 5 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
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particularly a risk given the 16-19 market would also be streamlined, and this poses risks 
to responsiveness, as discussed earlier. However, this problem could be even more 
acute in the context of adult qualifications. This is because these qualifications need to 
cover a wide range of occupation-specific areas of expertise and specialisations.  
For example, currently there are very specific qualifications in healthcare like diplomas in 
dementia. In the process of streamlining, this might be brought under a general 
qualification in healthcare, delivered with extended units on dementia. However, this will 
not allow adults who already have a diploma in healthcare to go back into further 
education and get a qualification in a specialised area to respond to market needs (i.e. 
just the specific dementia element, in our example). While similar examples are arguably 
less applicable in the context of 16-19 year-old learners, given their earlier stage of 
education where a broader based learning in a particular subject can add value, it is likely 
that adult qualifications have a greater need to be adequately specialised in order to 
prepare learners for new work roles.  
The second issue relates to the availability of viable AOs that can compete for bids if both 
the markets for 16-19 and adult routes are streamlined into tendered routes. The problem 
of shorting the market described under scenario 1 is more severe if both markets for 16-
19 year olds and adults are tendered for licences. 
Scenario 5: Adult 15 routes (with multiple, say 20, sub routes) tendered separately with 
single licence for 3 years; development of content is split out; 16-19 routes tendered 
separately 
 
This scenario is variation of scenario 4 with a larger number of sub-routes for the adult 
vocational qualifications and a shorter licence period.  
The larger number of possible routes under this scenario mitigates the risk of 
streamlining the market too much (described above). While it could create more 
perceived complexity in the market relative to a scenario with fewer sub-routes, 
recognition should not be an issue since the development of content is again separated 
out and qualifications are assessed by AOs that have been verified and won the licences 
to operate.  
Single licences per sub-route are combined with a shorter contract period for AOs to face 
sufficient level of potential competition.  
There would however be likely administration costs for training providers from the need to 
potentially contract with a larger number of AOs than would be the case with fewer sub-
routes being tendered. 
Scenario 5
Adult 15 routes (and multiple, e.g. 
20, sub routes within each route) 
tendered separately, market for 16 -
19 as in Scenario 2 or 3
Single exclusive license 3 years
Delivery, assessment
[content designed centrally]
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Scenario 6: Adult 15 routes (20 sub routes) tendered separately with single licence for 3 
years; development of content is not split out; 16-19 routes tendered separately 
 
This is a variant of scenario 5 with a change around the development of content; it is no 
longer split out and set centrally but instead is also tendered out to the AOs together with 
the delivery of support to training providers and assessment.  
The potential benefit of this scenario is that the content would be developed by the AOs 
that would be offering it to training providers, as is the case in the system currently. The 
fact that there is a single licence per route also means that vocational qualifications are 
likely to be recognisable. However, a key issue around this scenario is the risk that a 
single AO which develops the content for the particular sub-route may, without 
appropriate regulatory oversight, do this in such a way that it does not meet the needs of 
local employers. In addition, stakeholders have suggested that the development of 
content for new qualifications can take around 18 months – therefore there is a risk that 
when the contracts are tendered, there may be a lag between contract award and the 
delivery of the qualifications, or the licensees would need to just deliver the content that 
was developed by previous AOs who held the licence (which in turn hinders 
responsiveness).  The risks around the quality and relevance of the content could 
however be mitigated to some extent through appropriate regulatory oversight of content.  
Further options: incremental reform 
It is of course possible to attempt to address some of the market weaknesses discussed 
previously through incremental reforms where the current basic market structure is 
maintained but there is a significantly greater focus on regulation. Concerns about the 
rigour and recognisability of qualifications could for example be addressed through 
increased regulatory scrutiny (at the qualification level) before a qualification is approved 
by the regulator. Furthermore, stricter regulatory oversight of training providers and AOs 
may be required to counteract any perverse incentives (e.g. making qualifications easier 
to pass). Both would require a very considerable expansion of the remit and hence 
capacity of the current regulator (Ofqual).  
Other incremental reforms may include: 
• Centrally provided information on qualifications and benchmarking tools made 
available to facilitate navigation around the market and choice of best performing 
qualifications. 
Scenario 6
Adult 15 routes (and multiple, e.g. 
20, sub routes within each route) 
tendered separately, market for 16 -
19 as in Scenario 2 or 3
Single exclusive license 3 years
Content, delivery, assessment
[content designed by AOs]
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• Incentives for learners to progress on their learning pathway instead of moving 
from one level 1 vocational qualification to another (e.g. funding could be limited or 
capped for same level learning). 
• Incentives to involve smaller employers in qualification design to ensure their 
needs are represented in the development of new and updated qualifications. 
The advantage of incremental reforms is that the risk of disruption is smaller and some of 
the benefits of competition (e.g. choice, ability to switch and quality customer support) 
are retained. The downside is that incremental reforms may not be as effective as 
structural reforms at addressing the issues of rigour and recognisability and may only 
lead to marginal improvements in the system.  
For example, informational remedies (such as centrally provided information on 
qualifications and benchmarking tools) may enable better choices which over time would 
aid recognisability. However, there is risk that despite improvements, the system remains 
complex and difficult for learners, training providers and employers to navigate. Similarly, 
greater regulatory oversight over the content of qualifications upfront may aid rigour and 
reduce incentives for a race-to-the-bottom type competition. However, this implies a 
higher level of regulatory burden for AOs and the associated need for significantly more 
resources for the regulators.  
Summary assessment of risks 
Table 10 provides a summary of the magnitude of different risks (as defined earlier in this 
chapter) across the policy scenarios we have examined. The assessment of risks in the 
table does not take into account of any mitigating actions.  
Comparing the various risks associated with the six selected scenarios exposes a 
number of general findings: 
• There are generally lower risks (risk of system failure, risk of lower customer 
service quality) associated with scenarios which maintain a reasonable number of 
suppliers (AOs) in the market. 
• There is likely to be a high level of risk to responsiveness and medium risk of 
impractical content when the content is determined centrally unless appropriate 
mitigation actions are taken to involve relevant stakeholders in the development of 
content. 
• Any structural reforms create medium to high risk of disruption and higher 
administrative costs in the short term as the market adjusts to the new status quo.  
• There are inherent trade-offs between risks to rigour, recognition, responsiveness 
and innovation, as none of the scenarios is free of risks across all the objectives. It 
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is hence important for government to decide which features it places most weight 
on to help it determine which policy scenarios may be preferable.  
Table 10 Summary of risks for the six reform scenarios 
 
Implementation issues 
In addition to the benefits and risks associated with structural reform discussed above, 
we identified a number of cross-cutting implementation issues which the government 
should consider.  
• Timing of reforms. When structural reforms are proposed for any market, it is 
important to allow sufficient time so that market participants (e.g. AOs) can 
respond to changes adequately. For example, structural changes could require the 
AOs to develop new qualifications (if content is also tendered), and it takes on 
average between 12-24 months to do this, followed by a pilot period (probably 1 
year) when these are embedded among training providers.  
• Potential for planning blight. Uncertainty as to what changes will take place 
could create planning blight, i.e. reduce the incentive for AOs to invest in 
developing qualifications while they wait for policy to be fully specified. Having 
clarity over how the reforms will be implemented as early as possible reduces this 
issue. 
1. All (15) 16-18 
routes tendered 
together w ith single 
license and 5 year 
contract content split 
out, adult market as 
now
2.16-18 15 routes 
(and 4/5 sub routes 
w ithin each route) 
tendered separately 
w ith single license 
and 3 year contract 
content split out,adult 
market as now
3.16-18 15 routes 
(and 4/5 sub routes 
w ithin each route) 
tendered separately 
w ith multiple licenses 
and 5 year contract 
content split out, adult 
market as now
4. Adult 15 routes 
(and 4/5 sub routes 
w ithin each route) 
tendered separately 
w ith multiple licenses 
and 5 year contract 
content split out, 16-
18 market w ith routes
5. Adult 15 routes 
(and multiple, e.g. 20, 
sub routes w ithin 
each route) tendered 
separately w ith single 
license and 3 year 
contract content split 
out, 16-18 market 
w ith routes
6. Adult 15 routes 
(and multiple, e.g. 20, 
sub routes w ithin 
each route) tendered 
separately w ith single 
license and 3 year 
contract content 
included, 16-18 
market w ith routes
Systemic failure risk
Procurement risks
Disruption and increased administration 
cost risk
Ineff iciency risk
Quality of service risk
Insuff icient breadth risk
Risk of removing future competition
Risk of impractical content
Risk of insuff icient capacity
Risk of poor recognition
Risk of poor responsiveness
Risk of poor rigour
Risk of low  innovation
Lower risk
Medium risk
Higher risk
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• Involvement of AOs. Continuing dialogue with AOs and potentially involving them 
in content development (if this is to be split out) may reduce the risk of content 
being specified in a way which makes it difficult to teach and assess. 
• Content updates. DfE will need to consider how often content is likely to be 
updated. If content is updated mid-contract, there would need to be mechanisms 
in place for AOs to adapt their offer to match the change in content. 
• Contract depth. It needs to be decided how the elements of the product chain 
which are to be delivered by the market are packaged into contracts. In other 
words, to what extent these elements are specified in the contracts with the AOs, 
and thus by extension, how far these elements are ‘standardised’. For example, 
the contracts could be more general, leaving AOs scope to adjust the products to 
local needs, or they could be very highly specified with no scope for local flexibility. 
• Interaction with vocational education systems in other parts of the UK. Policy 
changes implemented by DfE will have a knock-on effect on other countries of the 
UK. AOs supply qualifications in England as well as other parts of the UK (as well 
as internationally), but for most England is the biggest market. The effects of 
reforms on AOs will be felt in other countries of the UK. 
• Interaction with other parts of the education system. Many AOs which operate 
in the VQ space also supply academic qualifications. Hence, any changes in their 
business due to reforms in VQ can affect their ability to provide academic 
qualifications. The same holds for changes in 16-19 and adult VQ as most AOs 
supply qualifications in both market segments. There is also the question of how 
the routes will interact with the adult VQ market. 
• Cost of bids. Given the vital importance of winning tenders to remain in business, 
AOs will invest significant resources in preparing the best possible bids. This 
raises two issues:  
• DfE needs to ensure that there is a robust process in place for selecting 
tenders such that the best AOs are chosen as opposed to the ones that look 
best on paper.  
• The costs associated with preparing bids may be passed on to training 
providers through higher prices.  There is also the issue that the cost of bids 
may put off smaller AOs from participating as they may lack the resource to 
prepare bids. 
• Cost of changing contracts. At the point when contracts are re-tendered there 
would be costs associated with changing from the current set of AOs to another, 
both centrally but also for training providers. 
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• A number of other practical issues also need to be considered: Decisions will 
also need to be made on certain practical considerations when working through a 
possible reform option including:  
• Actions to be taken in the event that there are no bidders for a market 
segment which is licenced; 
• Actions to be taken if there is failure mid-contract; 
• Conditions for re-opening a tender; 
• Mechanisms for monitoring quality to ensure it is in line with what was in the 
bid; 
• Mechanisms for regulating and monitoring prices to ensure they are in line 
with what was in the bid; 
• Mechanisms for penalising/rewarding underperformance/over-performance 
against the contract; and 
• The resource requirements and infrastructure required to establish 
tendering process and to judge bids.  
Conclusions 
We have explored options for reforms to address weaknesses identified in our market 
assessment analysis.   
Designing structural reforms in the market requires a number of decision along key 
dimensions, and each of these involves trade-offs between benefits and risks. The 
government needs to be aware of these trade-offs and associated risks for two key 
reasons: 
• Firstly, it is necessary to decide which risks are acceptable, as some outcomes 
may be more important than others, and this may vary across different parts of the 
market.  
• Secondly, once the associated risks are identified, it is possible to explore how to 
take action to mitigate them.  
Our assessment of selected reform scenario led to a number of findings: 
• Both short and long term risks associated with limiting access to the market 
need to be considered. Limiting access to the market to a single AO (or 
consortia) may create a short-term risk of system failure. If the AO fails there may 
be no alternative AO to step in (although clearly this risk can be mitigated against 
if for example there are contingencies in place for other AOs or indeed 
government to act as provider of last resort). In the long term, limiting access to 
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the market to a single AO (or consortia) could reduce the competition for that route 
in the future. Those AOs that do not successfully win the contract may not be able 
to viably continue offering services in the market until the contract is next awarded, 
leaving few or no credible alternative to existing licensees. 
• Interdependencies across sub-markets must be accounted for. The risks 
associated with reforms in one part of the market (e.g. adult vocational 
qualifications) are likely to be significantly dependent on decisions made about 
reforms in other parts of the market (e.g. young persons’ vocational qualifications). 
These interdependencies need to be carefully considered when reform options are 
identified to avoid unintended side effects in linked markets.  
• Contract breadth and contract depth are both determinants of the potential 
risks. Contract breadth relates to the number of qualifications that might be 
covered by a licence; and contract depth relates to the aspects of the product 
chain that are licenced (e.g. development of the content as well as assessment, or 
just the latter). In particular, we find: 
o There are likely to be more risks associated with very broad contracts that 
award a single monopoly AO (or consortium) a licence to deliver large 
proportions of the qualifications (i.e. relying only on competition for the 
market), than if contracts are tendered to allow multiple AOs to operate in 
the market to deliver particular qualifications (i.e. allowing for some 
competition in the market);  
o Potential risks associated with constrained contract depth (i.e. licensing 
only assessment, while designing vocational qualifications’ content 
centrally) include challenges to the practical delivery of such content by 
AOs and a risk to responsiveness if that content is not updated at 
appropriate intervals in line with employer needs.  
• Trade-offs across the RRRI characteristics must be made and explicitly 
accounted for. The balance of weight placed on RRRI characteristics is likely to 
differ across the market so ‘one size fits all’ is not likely to be appropriate.  
• Mitigation actions to manage these risks must be considered alongside 
exploring potential reforms. Many of the above risks can be mitigated through 
appropriate mechanisms, and it is essential to think through these possible 
mitigating solutions carefully when any reform choices will be made. For example: 
o To avoid system failure, there could be a requirement that AOs operating in 
routes for which they have not tendered have capacity to be called upon to 
step in to deliver assessment services should an AO fail in another route. 
o To avoid shorting the market such that upon re-tendering there remain no 
alternative AOs who could credibly bid; multiple routes could be tendered 
such that a number of AOs are able to operate within the market. 
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o To overcome the challenges associated with specifying contracts for such 
complex deliverables, it may be desirable to phase the introduction of 
tendering such that some parts of the market can be used as ‘trials’ to help 
learn what works and the potential behaviours of market participants.  
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